Elijah Mwendwa

Name: Course: Tutor: Institution: 20 October 2015 Determinism-Indeterminism Daniel Clement Dennett is an American renowned naturalist philosopher who specializes in the philosophy of mind (Dennett, 1977, pp.196). He gained much ground during the atheist movement that started in the early 21st century. Currently, he is a Professor of Philosophy, and Co-Director at Tufts University under the Center for Cognitive Studies. He is the author of Breaking the Spell, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Freedom Evolves, Consciousness Explained, and several other books. Recently he received two rewards of Guggenheim Fellowships, a Fellowship of Fulbright, and that of the Behavioral Science at Center for Advanced Studies. In 1987, he was promoted to the United States Academy of Arts and Sciences. His most recent book, authored by Linda LaScola, is entitled Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Behind Belief. This paper will deal with the topic of Determinism-Indeterminism, Free Will; or rather Freedom evolves, in relation to how Dennett tackles the problem in his various books. This paper is broken up into two major sections, indeterminism and then determinism, to try and simply the discussion. In each section, whether indeterminism or determinism, there will always be trail of thought on the works of Dennett. Since it is important to know the meaning of these sections, this moment will be to explain briefly what is meant by determinism and indeterminism in viewpoint of Dennett. First is to understand indeterminism, and determinism will simply be the vice versa of its Dennett’s definition. Hence indeterminism is the idea that events are not caused due to prior events. Opposite to determinism, it relates to chance. According to philosophical perspective, it is a relevant free will challenge in philosophy, especially in terms of metaphysical libertinism. Simply put, he uses indeterminism to produce alternative possibilities while that of determinism to select amongst the availed possibilities (Michaels and Tyre, 2012.P 291). Next is to discuss in details incidences of indeterminism both from the author’s perspective or other author’s view about his works. In his explanation to do with indeterminism, Dennett carefully integrates it to generate other possibilities using the Valerian model of decision making recognized and named prior to poet Paul Valery (Lang and Lawler, 1976, p.116). In his book Brainstorms (Dennett, 1979, p. 295), he suggested that his model of decision making, in relation to indeterminism, had certain features. The thought becomes a sought of a consideration-generator. That when faced with an essential decision, of which the output at the time is undetermined it usually does generate numerous generations, out of which some become immediately rejected as irrelevant either consciously or unconsciously. He continues to explain that such considerations selected by the agent to have better than negligible bearing regarding his decision will result into a reasoning process. If the reasoning process assiststhe agent best, these considerations eventually serve in terms of predictors as well as explicators regarding the agent’s last decision. Dennett then gives about six convincing reasons as to why this forms the type of free will to be easily declared by libertarians that they desire to have. He states that at initial point intelligent choosing, rejection, the considerations weighing appear to the subject as no differentiating matter of intelligence. Then second he thinks that it establishes the right place for indeterminism particularly for the libertarians, if that right place exists. From standpoint of biological engineering, Dennett says that free will or indeterminism becomes more efficient and the outcome is an occurrence of more rational decision making. His fourth statement in support of indeterminism is that it allows moral education to make some impact, in spite of not making all the impact. He goes on to encourage indeterminism saying that it gives room for personal essential intuition to notice that any person authorizes their own moral decisions (Dennett, 1979, p.296). In his final reason as concerns free will in the outlaid six reasons, he suggests that decision making model projects to multiplicity of decisions that surround any person’s moral decisions and then state that our ultimate decision actually is less important as a contributor to a sense of indeterminism as compared to decisions before(Dennett, 1979, p. 296). In the next two pages of Brainstorms (Dennett, 1979, p. 296-297) after page 295, Dennett affirms that both prior and subsidiary decisions dealing with indeterminism positively contributes to self-sense as responsible free agents and then he gives an example. The example is that suppose a person is faced with an essential decision to make, and upon deliberating for some span of time, the person finally comes to a quick solution. The solution being that the thought is enough, and now what is left is to act. This will happen in the full knowledge that considerations could have been lengthened, in the full knowledge that the outcomes may confirm that the decision contained error, but withstanding all these to accept responsibility that comes with it, just in case. At times, Dennett appears pleased with his outcome. Back to page 292 of Brainstorms (Dennett, 1979, p. 292) he relates that the outcome is not only what any libertarian looks for, but also a useful outcome nevertheless. He realizes that indeterminism sourced from the internal causal chains influencing human behavior can be installed at macroscopic level while at the same time preserve the intelligibility concerning practical deliberation that all libertarians require. He reasons that although determinism may sometimes be embraced due toits beneficial factors, it would be out of loss of nothing if people as well embrace macroscopic indeterminism in relation to human behavior, as it rob intelligibility lives by generating chaos. Forward to page 298 of Brainstorm (Dennett, 1979, p. 298), Dennett adds his plea again that people should not become fearful that causal indeterminism would lead to unintelligible lives. Linking his thoughts he says in the immediate following page 299(Dennett, 1979, p. 299) that indeterminism can also be seen in the disadvantages of determinism. On this page he claims that deterministic viewpoint in terms of branching the universe history and that of inexorable bit could inspire terror, and then concludes that perhaps this makes the libertarian right to relate the feeling to denial of determinism. He then insists that in such a denial and that denial only, would allow people to make sense of the idea that their lives were a creation out of their earlier decisions; that any moment is attached in a traceable path so that at any time people must accept responsibility for who they are. With this point, he actually encourages indeterminism. At other times, Dennett is skeptical (Dennett, 1979, p.295). In his explanation concerning his model on page 295, he asserts that to install indeterminism biased for the libertarian in the right place, is okay if the right place exists at all. He continues to say that it appears all that has happened to install indeterminism in that harmless place was nothing but installing it in some irrelevant place. Dennett, in fact, seems to continually solicit interest in the Valerian decision making model, but in favor of libertarian side? It is actually very unfortunate for him, that libertarians in any case neither accepted nor improved two-stage model of Dennett. A rhetorical question is left hanging: What would happen in case the libertarians accept Dennett’s offer he issued to them in 1978? If it happened, in the last three decades there would be marked difference concerning the past of the free will problem, perhaps ultimately reconciling indeterminism with that of free will, because this two-stage model presently performs, similar to Hume reconciling freedom with determinism. He explains this opinion exclusively on Brainstorms (Dennett, 1979, page 299). He says that compelling grounds to favor an indeterministic vision due to own actions may lack, but should considerations from other areas favor indeterminism, there is no harm to fairly sanguine concerning prospects as a result of incorporating indeterminism into the people’s picture of deliberation, in as much as the need for an incorporation is not yet manifest (Dennett, 1979, p. 300). The opinion of incorporating indeterminism deals with breaking the causal chain as a result of pre-determinism, and then providing a source for all novel ideas not already entangled implicitly with past events(Drouet, 2009, pp.662-675). At this point, it shall explain both free will and creativity. This necessitates indeterminacy in terms of irreducible and ontological quantum (Décanini and Folacci, 2007, pp-). But Dennett says, that irreducible randomness of quantum provides essentially only to the extent of the deterministic spurious-random computer science number generation. He presents a question that has two parts (Décanini and Folacci, 2007, pp-). One part he asks if the new improved suggested model dealing with human deliberation whether it can go well with joining up of random yet deterministic generation process; while the other part deals with consideration of human deliberation with the causally undetermined process. Then he makes a statement and a possible response out of the situation. The statement is: should it happen that the considerations occurring to the victim are rather unpredictable; then his response is: the reason for their unpredictability has all to do with lucky determination from some arbitrary, irrelevant factors. Then Dennett gives some examples of the factors like planets location or what one had for breakfast. In spite of his stable background in computer science as well as artificial intelligence, it does not surprise that Dennett goes ahead to seek a “computational” model of the mind. But no man is a machine and no mind is a computer(Schmidt and Kraemer, 2006, pp.73-80). Dennett welcomes the outcomes of modern physics and refuses to deny the existence of quantum randomness(Prevedel et al., 2011, pp.757-761). As regards him Dennett says that he is the one “naturalist” seeking to reconcile free will and natural science. It is interesting that with Dennett as a confirmed atheist, it appears out of odds that all of a sudden he possesses the “antipathy to change” explained by William James that is only features with religious believers. Quantum randomness is highly more atheistic as compared to pseudo-randomness, with the implicit of the latter author(Stankovic, 1997, pp.543-551). Despite his doubts, Dennett appears to have situated randomness in precisely the right place, the random production of other considerations for his sufficiently determined selection process(Miglino and Ponticorvo, 2009, pp.250-252). In the initial stage to do with free will, genuine quantum randomness breaks Laplacian causal chain determinism, with no decisions on their own random (Earman, 1971, p.729). Let’s move to his 2003 book entitled Freedom Evolves. Here is found Austin’s Putt that Dennett says clarifies the mistaken fright that determinism minimizes possibilities. With consideration that Dennett is an actualist, who has a belief in just one probable future, this considers close examination. To start with, never miss out on the irony that Dennett is employing “possible worlds” thinking, that causes the actual world that people live to have just a single possible future. Dennett then says that in the light of having a brighter understanding concerning possible worlds, there is need to expose three key confusions as regards possibility and causation that already bewildered the pursuit for a free will account (Dennett, 2003, p.23). He says that the explanation will appear to have an advantage once a prominent example is considered suggested by John Austin several years ago (Harries, 2007, p.x-xi). In a paraphrase, Austin takes a case where he misses a very short putt and kicks himself with the intent that he could have holed it(Orr, 2013, pp.694-710). The reason for the miss had nothing to do with the fact that he had tried. The truth was that he did attempt, but missed. Even if the conditions were altered it does not mean that he could hole it at that moment. While it may be true, but it becomes more valuable to converse concerning conditions as they exactly were, and still asserting that he could have done it. There is the problem. Neither does telling himself “I can hole it this time” mean that he shall hole it that time in case he tries; for possibly he could try and still miss, and yet fail to be convicted that he could not have done it. In fact, many subsequent experiments may affirm his belief that he could do it that time round, even though he did not(Orr, 2013, pp.694-710). As the case stand, Orr (2013, pp.694-710) says, Austin didn’t hole the putt. The question that remains is, suppose determinism is true, could he still attain it? The interpretation of the possible-worlds outlays the mistake in Austin’s thinking. One, considering that determinism holds, and that John Austin misses, and then makes H mean the sentence “Austin holes the putt.” The thing to do next is to select the set X of authentic acceptable worlds that need canvassing to find out whether he could have managed it. Suppose X is select to stand in for the two physical worlds which are replicas of the actual world at a certain time to before the putt. Because determinism holds to the suggestion that at any instant there is just a single physically possible future, it means that it has just a member, the real world that Austin misses. Therefore, in selecting the set X in this method, it gets clear that H has no world whatsoever in X. thus it is possible to conclude that it was truly not possible for Austin to hole the putt(Orr, 2013, pp.694-710). To sum up his propositions, there is given Austin’s ambiguity in view of his supposed possibilities. He uses the narrow method to try and explain his point. In truth, the narrow way of selecting X lacks the significance that he as well as several others imagines. As a result of this outcome it follows that the falsity of determination must never influence people’s belief that particular unnoticed events were nevertheless “possible,” in that essential daily sense of the word. Anyone can support this final claim by experimenting with a narrow domain where it is certain that determinism rules: the domain of chess-playing computer games (Theodoulides, 2003, pp.141-159). In his 1984 book, Elbow Room, Dennett affirms that the biological evolution has no need for quantum randomness(Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.517). In fact, on a rather serious note he expresses his utter shock on listening to Jacques Monod’s claim that random quantum processes were of essence to evolution(Ullmann, 2011, pp-). Monod defines the essence of chance, or rather “absolute coincidence” that it is similar to causal chains intersection that Aristotle called an “accident”(Ullmann, 2011, pp-).Indeed, the title Elbow Room is one expression of his thoughts. It goes something like this, in terms of its interpretation: are people just deterministic machines that have no actual freedom to act? Let’s consider determinism-indeterminism topic in details in the context of this book Elbow Room. Dennett reveals in Elbow Room on quick scan by the reader that determinism will not at all make humans identical to animals(Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401). He then explains this point. He starts out by mentioning his key goal in this book, to clarify the fact that people are like biological entities and then reason out why the point of free will is important in such a case. His relates his point in relation to what people are and the purpose for free will by using an evolutionary viewpoint. He gives a description of the digger wasp Sphex mechanical behavior to illustrate what he means. That insect has procedures, Dennett continues, that are genetically programmed to prepare for egg laying. If an experimenter interferes with any one of the chronological steps the wasp must start all over again repeating the step. As for an animal like wasp, the process of repeating a single behavior can continue indefinitely, with the wasp never appearing to notice what is happening(Wilson and Farish, 1973, pp.292-295). As regards the case to humans, Dennett states that it is exactly that kind of mindless, pre-determined behavior in which humans can prevent. Given the opportunity to repeat some futile activity indefinitely, people will come to notice the futility of it and by use of free will consider something else. This can be termed as an operational definition regarding people’s perception as concerns the meaning of free will. Dennett indicates that the truism that persons regard themselves in a state to avoid futility, many others have witnessed enough relating to the free will situation. He welcomes everyone interested with this analytical level to continue with life as he now moves further into finer details of the free will issue. Talking from the biological view, Wilson and Farish (1973, pp.292-295) say the question is asked as to trigger an individual by Dennett to find out the contrasts in the wasp and a person. The person is capable, on one hand, through relationship with his environment, develop some internal mental model in terms of the situation and then deduce an effective behavioral strategy. The wasp, on the other hand, possesses far smaller brain and diverse genetic program. Hence it fails to learn from its surrounding and in place of this becomes trapped in some endless and useless behavioral loop which is firmly determined by the genetic schedule. This is the sense regarding people as complex brains animals that can figure out reality and seem to select probable behaviors that Dennett considers free will. It is interesting to note that Dennett in a way sees not only determinism, but also indeterminism seeming to rule out free will(Bishop, 2003, pp.168-183). And this intense philosophical issue dealing with free will now becomes what is termed as a paradox. Adding flesh to his paradox statement, he gives two situations which actually present themselves so that it is all clear. In one sense, he believes that everyone feels as though they have free will which he says is that multitude of behavioral choices from which to choose. In another sense, modern biology, he explains, tend to generally investigate humans as if their internal work processes follows the exact biological principles of the wasps (Wilson and Farish, 1973, pp.292-295). Then he throws in a rhetorical question that about how the effort it will take a person to try and reconcile their feeling as regards free will with that notion that people might just be, after all, mechanical parts of the larger mechanical universe? Scrutinizing the issue of determinism in the paradoxical concept, Dennett begins by giving common sayings of people. First, he states the impression that people have as they claim that an individual chooses amidst many chance behaviors, and then he asks whether there really is a choice or rather that appears like there is a choice(Sengupta, 2009, pp.38-40). He keeps wondering whether people simply are better behaved then wasps, in the sense of them still being full mechanical in the ways of executing those behaviors. In fact, Dennett defines determinism on page one of Elbow Room (Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.519) this way: Determinism is “all physical events caused or determined by the sum total of all previous events.” The definition leaves out the question several people feel should not be left out at all, and that is: could there be a possibility that if one repeatedly replayed the entire universe from a single point in a certain time span it will end in the same future? Now that the question so far lacks a practical proof, it composes a long-term classic kind of philosophy; the results of which physicists have attempted to interpret through the use of methodologies to point out some answers to this question. Dennett says that a number of physics-focused philosophers have occasionally made attempts in relation to answering the question to do with free will through use of many-worlds interpretation(Steward, 2015, pp.43-48). He clarifies this point in terms of quantum indeterminacy which says that the moment is happens; a new possibility appears that leads to new universes branching off. This trial, he says, has happened 1920 onwards with physicists trying to convince themselves that indeed quantum indeterminacy can in a given way explain what is meant by free will (McKnight and Povoledo, n.d., p.546). According to him, Dennett terms this idea as silly. He summarizes his paradoxical thought questioning whether the random quantum-level resolutions can indeed provide persons with control, if any, over their behavior. Turning his attention to look into indeterminism, he asserts that is not a solution as well to the problem of free will. Indeed, after Dennett authored Elbow Room (Dennett, 1984, p.517) there has ever since cropped up a number of ongoing trial by particular scientists to try to answer this question. They propose, in their attempt to solve the quagmire, that the brain can be some useful device for the purpose of controlling quantum indeterminacy with the intent to construct any behavioral choice (Meadowcroft, 2005). Dennett argues that such measures put in place to salvage free will in terms of dodging the prison of determinism are mere waste. Dennett then attempts to explain some types of free will in his book Elbow Room (Dennett, 1984, p.521). Giving the perspective of many philosophers, he says that they claim that there is found incompatibility between determinism and free will. What several physicists do, he says, they appear to construct a kind of free will that includes a path for brains to utilize quantum indeterminacy in order to make choices that change the universe in people’s favor. In the case of multiple universes, he concludes, to choose amongst the chance universes. Dennett then proposes that it is possible to have another type of free will, a kind of free will that people can be perfectly joyous with although it may not them the power to act multi-dimensionally at any given time(Caujapé-Castells et al., 2013). This becomes quite interesting about him as he accepts both determinism as well as free will at one time. Dennett says that all persons are endowed with free will. The kind of free will he believes in is ultimately mentioned clearly in the final chapter of the book. That tendency of using our power to achieve active agencies, combined with those biological devices which respond to our surrounding in terms of rational, worthy courses of action. Dennett has rather sluggishly, through the entire book, separated the notion of behavioral choice from his idea dealing with free will. How possible on earth is it, Dennett asks, and that people have free will in the absence of indeterministic choice? (Caujapé-Castells et al., 2013) He then decides to put his emphasis on control rather than libertarian choice. He is bothered by the hypothesis that if at all the mechanical brains, as other philosophers in support of physicists say, indeed takes charge of our behavior so that the brains produce nothing but good behaviors for us, if all this is true, then really do need such choice? This is mere illusion of behavioral choices, Dennett says, and then seeks to know whether they be actual choices (Wolf and Pohlman, 1983). He wants to know further whether that sensation of having freedom to implement at least two behaviors instantly is an example of an illusion. Dennett then claims that choices, per se, do have a general sense of existence based one thing. That is, all our contextual decisions lead us to actually limit our alternatives because the situation tends to be more specific. In the choicest specific circumstance, Dennett proposes that there remains just a single option left to us. On page 152 of Elbow Room, Dennett says: It is this contrast between the stable and the chaotic that grounds our division of the world into the enduring and salient features of the world, and those features that we must treat statistically or probabilistically. And this division of the world is not just our division; it is, for instance, Mother Nature’s division as well. Since for all Mother Nature knows (or could know) it is possible that these insects will cross paths (sometime, somewhere) with insectivorous birds, they had better be designed with some avoidance machinery (Dennett, 1984, p. 152). This endows them with a certain power that will serve well (in general).” He then makes another statement. Dennett claims that determinism, in any way, does not eliminate moral responsibility. If people stay put and become determined to act like they do, he starts to clarify, where should people now categorize individual responsibility? How would one be proven responsible and become punished in relation to his/her behavior if he/she, at the initial instance, had no choice as how one would behave?(Oostrom et al., 2015, p.324)Dennett then issues a twofold answer to the question. First part of the answer, he suggests that people would be held responsible with regards to their actions on the grounds of their historical experience, an effective tool into making people behave in a certain socially welcomed way(Oostrom et al., 2015, p.325). Second part of the answer, he insists that will just work alongside the fact that the people are informed that they will be held responsible and sought then sought to react to this claimed state of affairs by fully controlling in order to avoid punishment. That the people who break the set societal norms and rules and then get punished may only behave in a single way they can, and they are held not responsible for their actions, may lead to a worse behaved individuals even in the face of a threatening punishment(Oostrom et al., 2015, p.329). A completely utilitarian approach as regards to the responsibility issue, Dennett says(Kane, 2002, page 246). To express moral indignation at the time that people break those rules of proper behavior becomes useful to the level of its contribution in terms of dissuading such behavior. It can also be argued from the viewpoint of utility. The question he puts forth goes kind of like this: would it be considered moral in punishing individuals that are incapable to do no other but break a rule? Indeed, he tries to answer himself, people have their say to join up and better their condition by forming rules and then enforcing them. Arguing from utility’s view, he asserts that it would be worse off had they not done so (Kane, 2002, page 249). He then mentions that fatalism is destructive that must be guarded against (Religion-online.org, 2015). In this final issue in his book Elbow Room, Dennett asks the reason why people don’t collapse into fatalism if in any case they don’t have genuine behavioral choices. Once more, Dennett’s reasoning is centered on the fact that people may in reality lack an alternative behavioral choice, but still possesses control of this particular behavior(Goodspeed-Chadwick, 2006, pp.53-55). Dennett then invites his audience to consider looking around the entire universe and then asks if genuinely there are beings conceivable whose will outdoes the free will in the humans. In his answer, Dennett replies, no, not really. He proceeds to explain more in his book Elbow Room, as to why all the possibilities to cause individuals to prove their libertarian choice have succumbed to failure, and moreover in their eventual analysis not considered essential anyhow (Ginet and Rankin, 1963, p.99). He protests that all humans have all the control as regards their behavior as comparable to any other thing in the universe. He continues to say that humans are most fortunate as regards the opportunity to generate good behavior. That actually people need satisfaction with that which they have and not get worried over their absence of libertarian free will (Ginet and Rankin, 1963, p.100). Some critiques about Elbow Room concerns people’s intuition regarding free will. Some claim that theory of Dennett has no much satisfying say as regards dealing with the issue why there exists the feeling so strong of not having a behavioral choice. An answer to this question has to do with evolution which has highly influenced people’s sensation to have behavioral choice. The properly developed human sensation to have free will and then being capable of selecting among possible behaviors ends with strong survival value(Starkloff, 1972, p.1226). Those people who lose the feeling, Dennett affirms, of their capability to plan alternative behaviors and then implement their possible behavior choices likely becomes fatalistic and ceases struggling for survival. As far as Dennett is concerned, to believe in free will is one important step to having free will. He says that the moment people plan for the future and then think concerning possible actions to do in the future, people are having some good use of biological-based expensive resources known as brain power. Evolution has fashioned people to strongly feel that their entire effort as regards planning pays off, that they control what they do(Tamir, 2009, pp.101-105). He concludes on deadly fatalism by saying that if the link between their brain’s efforts in modeling reality and foretell the future, which leads to possible good outcomes becomes disconnected from the people’s self-sense and their will, then fatalism looms to destroy the behaviors. In his book The Intentional Stance (Dennett, 1987, p. 250), Dennett is rather displeased with scientific evidence canons on indeterminism by saying that they virtually reject anything described from a different approach concerning oft-repeated species behavior, which he terms as that sort of behavior revealing no certain intelligence at all. This behavior, he claims, is more explained as the results of some boring combination of tropism as well as conditioned response, that is determinism to some extent. Now to page 350 of the same book, Dennett says that most philosophers are not completely sure as regards what they do talk about-about the reality of the issues- and more often than not it takes them a rather long period in recognizing that somebody with a kind of diverse approach is making a contribution(Dennett, 1987, p.350). Daniel C. Dennett, in his 2003 book Freedom Evolves, tries to explore more as concerns free will as well as moral responsibility that complements is other views regarding consciousness and personhood. Similar to Consciousness Explained, Dennett announces his perception of his arguments in advance. He looks for those who with fright concerning critique analysis of freedom that in some way it will undermine persons’ beliefs in the moral considerations reality. He compares himself to an interfering crow that persists in telling Dumbo he actually does not require the feather which he strongly believes is making him to fly. Let’s take some look into free will and altruism as explained by Dennett in this book Freedom Evolves. Dennett’s opinion concerning free will is compatibilism taken an evolutionary twist, which implies that even though people’s actions might become predetermined according to the strict sense of their actions, yet people can still become free in every way that matters (Lance, 1975, pp.59-80). Due to the simple fact that people behavioral activities did evolve. From this viewpoint, free will becomes freedom to create decisions without duress as supported also by Kantian autonomy. This is opposed to be impossible, unnecessary freedom due to causality itself. In his effort to clarify this distinction, he replaces the term ‘inevitability’ with his own ‘evitability’, and then defining evitability as the agent’s ability to anticipate chance consequences and act in avoiding undesirable ones. Evitability, he says, is fully compatible with human action in terms of being deterministic. Dennett then looks a little bit into altruism, deny the popular view that it requires acting in relation to others’ benefits with no personal gain to oneself. He explains that this term has to be understood in the context of helping oneself by helping others, that is, expansion of self to become more inclusive rather than being selfless. To reveal this blend, he terms such actions as ‘benselfish’ finding the people’s capacity roots for the evolutionary pressures that generated kin selection. The way he treats free will and altruism, is an onset demonstration as to why people should refrain from accepting the traditional definitions regarding either term. A personal commitment to adhere to high ethical standards, Dennett proposes, enhances one’s meritorious mutual arrangements. He related this to the considerations of game theory in the celebrated Prisoner’s Dilemma; where ‘moral’ agents that cooperate succeed more than those ‘non-moral’ agents that fail to cooperate. However, cooperation would not appear to naturally rise as the agents are enticed to ‘defect’ and reestablish Nash equilibrium (Carmona, 2012, p.324), which in many cases is not the most suitable solution for all involved. As Dennett comes to a close of his point, he contemplates the likelihood of people either opting to be in or out of moral responsibility; and suggests in view of the aforementioned benefits, that many would decide to opt in, especially when issued with opting out options like imprisonment or institutionalization. With some reference to Benjamin Libet’s experiments (Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401), Dennett argues that those experiments in demonstration regarding non-existence of conscious volition or decision are nothing but a vague conclusion about volition. He says that there are a lot of ambiguities in terms of the timings regarding the various events involved. It becomes interesting to notice how Libet tells the time readiness potential happened with use of electrodes, Dennett laughs, but depending on the subject reporting the a clock’s hand position to find out when conscious volition was made. As Dennett indicates, this report only appears to bring different things together; far from the objective time claimed that they actually occur (Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401). Dennett then spend a whole chapter just to criticize theory of Robert Kane as regards libertarian free will. Kane has a firm belief rooted in particular rare and uncommon events- events he terms as self-forming actions or SFA’s (Kane, 2001, p.236). Dennett discovers that there is no assurance a similar event will happen in a person’s life. If it fails to occur, says Kane, the person has no free will in that case. However, they will appear exact as anyone else. Dennett, therefore, notices an importantly undetectable idea of free will to be unbelievable (Kane, 2001, p.248). So much for Dennett himself and his own books, let’s now consider Dennett and his fellow author or Dennett et al, or rather to other authors talking about Daniel C. Dennett but strictly within bound of the topic: determinism-indeterminism. The question to tackle is: does self even exist? It is important a guiding question because it will cause as to find out whether the self-aspect and make decisions and so seem to follow indeterminism or whether this self-image follows determinism, in the sense that it is controlled by prior events. A quick look at the word “self” in psychology, it refers to an individual’s trait and memory. Dennett and Kinsbourne (1997, p.576) will gladly call it the “Cartesian model of the self.” The inner self seems to access the individual, that is, a person’s sensory input seems like a multi-modal display of “mind’s eye”, as though an individual possesses an inner “theatre”. Searle puts it this way regarding consciousness, that it is a “[c]combination of Qualitativeness, Subjectivity and Unity” (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1997, p.575-577). Velleman (1994, p.121) on a similar note thinks of the self as that unified “arena”. McDermott, on his part would say that self in a way stands for a label that speaks concerning what individuals would take to be the source of their actions. Beginning from the point of moral responsibility, it becomes clear that events just happen if there are the most appropriate antecedents, says Searle. To attribute causation to an individual, it forces those treating them to regard them as mere causally efficacious system. Locke gives as an example of the self and terms it “forensic”, to stand for that person that is morally responsible. So how possible would it be for self to engage in her actions and eventually be morally responsible? A self, from the perspective of Searle (1969, p.787), refers to a conscious agency combined with conscious rationality. And to mingle in an action, an individual must choose the action with regards to reasons. And for those reasons in relation to an action to become a person’s reasons, the reasons which an individual would have to be those reasons of the persons’ selves. Therefore, indeterminism will speak louder in such a case as compared to determinism. The difference between just a motion, like that of rock rolling down the hill, as well as an action, like my typing this paper, is due to a self that wills the action. What actually causes us to become agents is due to the fact that we can successfully interpose ourselves into some causal consequence, with the intent of the out coming events trace their paths back to us. Thus, it appears that the most essential ingredient in an action, in contrast to mere motion, is the self or the individual. As concerns the example of the rolling rock, we do not actually blame the rocks for rolling but in reality blame the individuals that pushed the rocks. It becomes fundamental, Searle concludes, for people to firmly suggest the existence of an “irreducible self” should we desire to attribute what is called moral responsibility. The reason for talking about irreducible is due to the fact that people can never minimize selves to causes or even components. Doing so would mean the eventual removal of inherent first-person self-nature, reducing self to mere objectively impersonal causing consequences. It is valid thus to declare that should be ignored as nothing, then the so-called moral responsibility will be threatened. We now have a You Tube expo of “What is Free Will” by John Searle. He asserts that the problem of free will is due to no progress made (YouTube, 2015). It is the exact issues and the same mistakes that people keep repeating over and over again. He explains that the reason for the special free will problem is that we have inconsistent views as each person apparently seems to have some overwhelming reasons. The reason for believing is that we have free will is that we live it every day. You can decide to raise your arm, and then follow it with the action of the arm going up, and so can you choose not raise any arm and no action to raise both arms follow. In all these cases, we notice voluntary actions that were not forced. It is interesting because you can explain the reason for whatever happened in case you have some information concerning it. For instance, if a person asks why did the free way road collapse? We would tell the person that signifies why it had to collapse, why the causes were sufficient to make it collapse. When we don’t see any wind and then suppose that is generally not true, don’t forget than our human behavior are linked to the environment in the world. And this human behavior has now to be explained in terms of causing sufficient ambitions. But if that’s true that were completely at the mercy of the causal forces then free will is an illusion (YouTube, 2015). So, we have two inconsistent views: the experience of free will gives us the conviction of free will; and the general knowledge about how the world works gives us a conviction of determinism (YouTube, 2015). Then his gives the difference between free will and other illusions. As concerns other illusions one can live his life and notice that it is just an illusion. You can have two separate lines but you live believing that it is a single line, even though demarcating distinctively shows two lines. Now this is illusion. When it comes to free will you cannot live your life on the assumption of determinism. You’re going to the restaurant and you want veal or steak. You cannot throw back and claim that you’re a determinant (YouTube, 2015). “I’ll just wait and see what happens?” You tell yourself. If you refuse to exercise free will [and refusal will be to the person an intelligible exercise of free will], you can’t however live outside the conviction of free will. It is something within biological evolutionary system about humans, we can’t escape it. Now that we have two self-consistent views each sufficed with information, and the fact that they are incompatible, would quickly cause us to throw one and embrace the other. However, none has to be given up, says Searle, as each is very important (YouTube, 2015). While looking into the multiple drafts of Dennett, he and his colleague Kinsbourne make an argument that there is not a good reason to think that one’s sensory inputs joins in some “Cartesian Theatre” within the mind, or the self. Back in 1993, Dennett blatantly says that none is in charge or in control of the self. Here is how he makes his defense with his fellow authors. Dennett et al. make an argument that denies the idea of only having one locus as regards perpetual consciousness, in other words, they give a plus to indeterminism. They make their first objection by stating that “Cartesian materialism” implies an infinite regress. Any person who considers the self or the mind has to have his/her own theatre to be declared as conscious. But if we consider the mind or inner being named self to be having consciousness, instead of we being possessive of the consciousness, then the indeterminism of Dennett may as well be declared as worthless. Problem two inline that Dennett et al. highlight is to do with simultaneity recognition (Honeyford, 2012, pp.17-25). For the purpose of verifying simultaneity, there needs to be one central focus as location of consciousness, let us take the mind as one example of a central location. Of consideration will be a simultaneous tap on the toe as well as the forehead, to add some flesh to the example. From arithmetic view, the distance between forehead and brain is much shorter than that distance between the toe and brain. Simply put, forehead-brain distance is much shorter than that of toe-brain. If you have a person that desires a simultaneous tap, he/she would suggest having some “delay circuit” to maintain the forehead tap without consciousness till the tap at the toe “arrives”. The question which keeps disturbing is this: why the need to stay the sensory input just for a reason that something relevant will come at some latter time? (Honeyford, 2012, pp.17-25) Gazzaniga, in fact, will offer an alike thought, that he immediately terms as an evolutionary mistake. Gazzaniga wonders, How on earth the brain comes to “know” in advance to work out a delay just for the forehead tap and more interestingly retain it “out of consciousness” till the toe-tap arrives? He claims that this is wrong. Freud then comes in to try and harmonize the delay and the action anticipated. He mentions that this would possibly mean that there are minima of two regions of the brain, which he calls unconscious and conscious. Yet people only tend to be biased concerning conscious self and even declare that it is the “real me”(Gazzaniga and Reuter-Lorenz, 2010, p.980). Dennett et al. argues by stating that asking when the person “I” noticed a certain thing is similar to asking when the British Empire noticed the War Truce of 1812, because both are spread out in terms of time and space. The delay example fails the test for the simple reason that claiming that “I” became aware of something after the experiment has falsehood in it as the experiments gives the impression that people know about things even if they may not report, or rather that they can’t report that they are aware. The truth of the matter is that there is assurance that the entire system is ever informed of anything concurrently as its parts. The thing here is that there isn’t a good reason so as to send information to some central region prior to processing, especially with the intent that you need some fresh information from the central location. The first processing needs be the last one, that is, just a single processing is enough. Hence, there a lacks any good reason to make us think that there’s centralized self-consciousness (Lambert, Good and Kirk, 2010, pp.281-293). Moreover, Dennett claims, that selves do not make the final judges over choices; it is comparable to the case of competing “candidates”. He explains his point with an example of different forms of aphasia where displayed deficiency of speech disorders is. Just like individuals have several versions as regards what they sense, the same happens to the several versions that they will use to explain. He concludes on this point by saying that it only brings forward the selection process. Taking a look at another example regarding self-consciousness or unconsciousness, we consider an automated lace-tying and the manual chess playing (Theodoulides, 2003, pp.141-159). The moment we know the way to tie the shoe laces, there is no need to keep thinking about it, and the same case goes to our ‘deliberate’ acts, they never entail deliberation. Dennett claims that this applies to every type of acts, aside from the speech acts. Somewhat, deliberate are hardly numerous. If at all there isn’t a central self that perceives, then it follows that, as in his previous chapters, he proceeds, there isn’t a central self-choosing for our actions or words. Thus, there is no central word choice (Theodoulides, 2003, pp.141-159). We consider Daniel Dennett’s you tube expo entitled “Daniel Dennett Explains Consciousness and Free Will”(YouTube, 2015). He begins by saying that most people view consciousness as something that is wonderful, and so does he. But, he immediately adds, it [consciousness] is not a miracle, it is not magic. It is all to do with tricks, he says. Consciousness is about tricks of the brain. Daily we learn what those tricks are and how they do fit together. Moreover, we learn more to know what is there past the tricks themselves. Moving on, Dennett says that that idea in itself may be offensive to a number of people. They really do not buy this idea as it seems as some assault to them (YouTube, 2015). Concerning these people, Dennett thinks that they are making a prime mistake-a prime mistake because if they persist on thinking that way you might tend to confirm that. The result is you may be removed out from history. Then he discusses what really scares people concerning this idea (YouTube, 2015). He starts by saying that the hidden agenda in all these is the free will. He says that if people realize that they are to use mechanistic theory of consciousness it would show that ‘Oh my gosh we don’t have free will’; and then life has no meaning. I can’t be held responsible for my best or worst deeds. This actually does not follow, he says. That fear that it would follow is that which rattles people. His approach to this is to challenge this desire and say no. Anything a person wants, or could want in a way of free will, that person could have. There are things that you cannot have whether what. He then explains ‘the only freedom that really matters’ (YouTube, 2015). For several billions of years ago in this planet there was life but no free will. Physics hasn’t changed but we now have free will. The variation is not in physics, as it has nothing to do with determinism or indeterminism. It has all to do with biology engineering which explains that over those many years, competences have been designed and evolved. And the competence of a dolphin and a chimpanzee has huge cognitive competence than that of a lobster or a starfish. Our cognitive competence actually dwarfs those of dolphin or chimpanzee as it is far much superior. This is because as humans we can represent our reasons, say why you did something. This results into responsibility-responsibility because we can respond to challenges for our actions. Why? Not just we have reasons, but because we have reasons that we consciously represent. This gives us the drive to evaluate the consequences for our actions, in the light of what other people tell us. To share our wisdom with others; no other species on the earth does that, Dennett asserts. We have the power, and this gives us the obligation. This is what makes us free in such a way that no bird is free, for instance (YouTube, 2015). Gazzaniga makes it clear that actions are completed, kaput, prior to the brain becoming conscious of them. For instance, it is more advisable to jump at the hearing of a rustling grass as compared to discovering that it was the rattlesnake’s tail’s sound (Gazzaniga and Reuter-Lorenz, 2010, p.899). The reality is that you never make a conscious decision before jumping. My choice to jump was justified post hoc that I observed a snake, yet in reality, I never saw one; it was a mere automatic response. Notice that self-consciousness takes too long. But the truth of the matter is that we have no conscious processing that resulted into a jump (Gazzaniga and Reuter-Lorenz, 2010, p.902). Our explanation that follows, so to speak, as concerns jumping deliberately, is mere fabrication. Eugene Marais, in his aim to give ethological evidence versus the Cartesian self, wrote “The Soul of the White Ant” (Marais, 1969, p.79). Marais claimed that the termite hill is the real animal whereas the termites were just mere agents within it, and as concerns their seeming organization, that it was due to the termites’ behavior within the nest. But he insisted that there isn’t any soul termite within the termite nest (Marais, 1969, p.80). To affirm his argument, Marais (1969, p.81) brings in the input of Dennett and Humphrey and picks an explanation from the 8th page of their book. The two say that there isn’t a single proper self, as they clarify their statement from the fact that many are the complex systems but which perform their function with no particular central supervision. A termite colony’s behavior gives an excellent example of it, but quite unaffected due to any master-plan (Marais, 1969, p.83). Proceeding on, Dennett find the following to relate to us. He says that those strangest as well as the best attractive constructions include the making by Homo sapiens. Any normal person of the species is a self; whose brain issues words and deeds. The scene of an organized termite colony appeared to certain observers as though all termite colonies must have had a soul. Only later on to realize, that it was nothing but millions half-independent tiny agents, each automated, and doing its stuff. Also wonderful is the human self-organization that to several observers it has appeared that every individual being possesses a soul, a benevolent Dictator. Velleman (1994, p.123) argues that the self is discovered in the action. Thus, we have the self-based skeptics’ model. It claims that “self” is an illusion; that is, consciousness without will. Due to few incompetency of this model, some objections do arise. In a short while we shall look into some of the critical objectives as relates to Dennett, Dennett et al, and anything associating to Dennett. The first objection is that to do with the rolling rock that gave room for the emergence and division fallacy. While we look into this case of the rock rolling down a hill, we need not suppose that the rolling rocks are just a single rounded thing. First, you cannot attribute the rolling rocks to a certain atom, molecule, or what have you, inside the rock. If the atoms of the rocks were scattered all round instead of being in some ball-like shape, definitely they would not roll down the hill. The same case is to self. Should we regard the self as a loose aggregate due to uncooperating components, it makes no sense to attribute causal powers to the self. On the other hand, if we assume self as one cooperating composite, it may be causally effective. Therefore, a composite self does not entail it being causally effective; truly, just as the rolling rocks downhill, so is the composite self-deliver its causal efficacy. To respond, Dennett argues that we appear to act as a unit, it relies more on a certain internal competition. That brain state with the “strongest” effect on the motor cortex is that which ends in action (Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.520). In between the states, there isn’t “deciding”; but every rock pushes itself downward due to a possible choice. That personal choice leading to an action means that indeterminism. It would refer to determinism if we take period between decision making and seen action, since the decision is before, or prior event, preceding that of rolling, then it would well fit as determinism. Simply put, it’s about the perspective of the observer in his arrangement of events due to his special reference point(Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.521). Second, it is true that the rock is a single thing? It is quite up to task to draw some demarcating line to distinguish whether a rock is a single piece, a network, or even atomic cloud. Dangerous will be our metaphysical presumption only to think of a termite colony as being a network or a loose aggregate, whereas a self or yet that a rock is not. Toname something as “self” or a “rock” has nothing but how its labeled matters most; thus, have to be capable of drawing the separating line appropriately (Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.523). Let’s develop this argument below. Third, creatures’ group behaviors look orderly, but they are not. Any regular behavior has no attachment with the centrally existent controlling self. Weather as an example of a complex system, may display a lot of regularity but without particular order(Watson and Dennett, 1986, p.527). Let’s consider another objection put across which deals with problems concerning Dennett and termites. Ismael (2007, p.12) to a large extent agrees with Dennett but desires to improve on his model. He mentions that there exist three models that signify system degrees. System one is a self-organizing system. System two is a navigating system. System three is the Dennett’s model. In the first system which is a termite colony displays completely mechanical with no centralized control (Ismael, 2007, p.13). The second system referring to the internal consciousness utilized to guide movement. The third system deals with consciousness as a mere side effect because of the subsystems’ automation. Should system 1 or 3 are true concerning ourselves, we shall be devoid of moral responsibility as well as free-will. This will promote determinism as compared to indeterminism. Ismael (2007, p.14) appears to think concerning his model, which is system two only, to give a type of control that all may desire concerning their actions. He uses that analogy of a ship that finds out a new ground and then proceeds to map it out in its exploration process. The “map” will stand in for our consciousness, which is also essential for the navigation purposes. Some examples of these navigation purposes include the layout manner of the world, remembering the food location, which creatures are enemies, and with these, he apparently believes require consciousness. Ismael (2007, p.15), then claims that the internal monologue, known as the Joycean Machine, shows explicitly consciousness unity and decision making. Although self could be as a committee, he continues, it possibly will speak with a single voice and eventually make decisions. But should the committee fail to exist as one thing, it appears as though a composite entity might still become responsible and even have reasons. To respond to problems of Dennett and the termites, Libet (Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401) issues evidence that declares the mental as secondary to causal chain processes. Soon et al, Bode et al, among many others support Libet’s idea with more evidence. In spite of a number of objections from philosophers regarding this work, such as Mele, Libet believes to some extent it demonstrates a particular action unconsciously initiated and it becomes sufficient in his view, to strip self-consciousness of some causal effects, even if there be such a thing as a self(Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401). Concerning system 2 model already mentioned, suppose voluntary actions are generated by a self’s volitions, there must be a response to tell us whether those volitions on themselves are voluntary. If they be voluntary, then we obtain an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, we choose to notice that voluntary choices are only explainable by something non-voluntary, with the intent of avoiding this regress, to obtain the outcome that voluntary acts are due to non-voluntary events. It could very well be certain non-conscious navigation of brain states and that of memory systems that steer our “selves”. If any reader should doubt my point here, stop right there and remember a case where you tried recalling something but you were not able to, and however, sometime later, it all of a sudden pops into the head. The question is, where did the answer come from? Did it have anything to do with your conscious choice? No. I, Libet, then dare venture that any planning as well as decision making is carried out non-consciously. We start to “think” concerning it and “decide” the moment we know the outcomes of the computations (Robinson, 2012, pp.395-401). Finally, suppose a committee declares a decision, the decision wasn’t made by declaring the decision, argues Ismael (2007. P.19). Rather, the decision declaration is just a show of what decision already reached by the committee members. The same way, a certain choice is the outcome of both computations as well as Joycean machine, not the cause. This, Dennett declares, is a unique form of determinism because of the following reasons. One, decisions come but are not voluntary, as in it’s a prior event before taking an action, a future event, so determinism applies. These decisions pop into the brain from nobody knows where. No one witness them being made; only witness their arrival. Let’s have a look at Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett’s debate as regards free will; stating why evolution is true. A while ago Daniel Dennett published a lengthy critique of the book Free will, by Sam Harris (Harris, 2012, p.675). Sam is both a determinist and incompatibility; which implies that his view of incompatible-determinism has to do with libertarian free will. Contrasting this, is the deterministic and compatibilist by Dennett; which implies that his point of view as regards determinism is in its unification with compatibilist, or simply put, compatible-determinism. Dennett explores this thought in his books: Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves, as already discussed from the initial pages of this work. Dennett made a statement that will roll on this unique discussion. He said that the moment people presume that they don’t have free will, which would the first curse to endanger the society. Then I will give two quotations from his essay post receiving Erasmus Prize. Dennett’s essay is named “Sometimes a spin doctor is right”. The quotes are: “There is-and always has been-an arms race between persuaders and their targets or intended victims, and folklore is full of tales of innocents being taken in by the blandishments of sharp talkers (Harris, 2012, p.676). This folklore is part of the defense we pass on to our children, so that they will become adept at guarding against it. We don’t want children to become puppets! If neuroscientists are saying that it is no use-we are all already puppets, controlled by the environment, they are making a big, and potentially harmful, mistake.” “…we,” he goes on, “[D.D. and Erasmus] both share the doctrine that free will is an illusion is likely to have profoundly unfortunate social consequences if not rebutted forcefully.” Speaking of Sam Harris (Harris, 2012, p.657) let me give areas in which he and Dennett harmonize as concerns free will, and after that, their fall outs. As concerns determinism(Harris, 2012, p.695), both Sam and Dennett agree that the human thought as well behavior are due to prior universe states alongside its laws-and the fact that indeterminism contributions, if any, are entirely unwelcomed to the free will question. They agree that individuals present thoughts as well as actions affects how they think and act in the future. Both acknowledge that individuals transform, acquire skills, and then are eventually better prepared to obtain whatever they want to harvest out of life. They equally notice that there is a variation in a morally healthy individual as well as a psychopath, and between one that is motivated or disciplined, and hence in a position to accomplish his goals, and one that suffers weakness of will. Both Sam and Dennett comprehend that planning together with reasoning guide all human behavior in uncountable ways so that the ability to adhere to the set plans and as well as being responsive to reasons is an example of what makes individuals human. They agree in so many things, Sam says, that at one moment Dennett referred to him as “compatibility in all things except the name”. Nonetheless, Sam cannot buy this idea, as he explains further that Dennett’s other write up depict him as though he were unaware of the many things that humans beings attempt to achieve. At some instances I have thrown out the baby with the bath, you say [Sam referring to Dennett’s statement]; at others, Sam continues, you just complain that I won’t call the baby with the correct name, “free will”. He then wonders which of the two does Dennett actually implies about him. In spite of the several agreements, there are two key areas that they diverge (Harris, 2012, p.678): The first key area Dennett thinks that compatibilists like him, Sam (Harris, 2012, p.679) affirms, have just tried demystifying substitutes for the concept of the folks. I believe Sam asserts, that Dennett has just changed the subject and become ignorant as par the very feature they should be addressing, that is “libertarian” free will, alongside its moral implications. The legal purpose of you [Dennett] to cause free will to be “presentable” is through carrying out conceptual surgery on the key contentious point. As a result, whether you are convincible or not, Sam declares, it must become clear in your mind that there is a difference between better concerning a feature and that of thinking regarding something else. Sam then says that he seeks to enlighten Dennett that in spite of his claim, of doing the former-thinking concerning a feature-he is actually performing the latter either consciously or unconsciously, and Dennett needs to know that. The second key area starts something like this: Dennett believes that macroscopic level determinism is not related to that question dealing with human freedom as well as responsibility. Inasmuch as Sam supports that its irrelevance to a number of things they both care about, the irrelevance bit in terms of Dennett’s suggestion is misplaced (Harris, 2012, p.682). It is misplaced because the acceptance of incompatibilism has essential intellectual consequences and that of morality that Dennett apparently ignores. And this should be the highest valued being, as viewpoint of Sam is that it leaves hatred at the point of being patently irrational, whereas departing form love unscathed (Harris, 2012, p.687). Should one be concerned regarding the maintenance of a philosophical position, as Dennett rightfully is[backup from Sam Harris], with the intent to assist eliminate human hatred would be apparently far more advantageous rather than just changing of the popular illusion. As previously stated, let me affirm again that the initial parting of opinion as regards free will has to do with compatibilists and incompatibilists. Incompatibilists say that incompatible-determinism free will; which is actually the scientific thesis which is causal agents for all that happens. The incompatibilists adhere to the fact that unless there be “random swerves” that interfere with iron chains due to physical causation, not even one of people’s decisions can actually be truly free. Carefully following the statement it will become clear that something being caused has that implication of not being free. The compatibilists are, on the other hand, quick to deny this fact and it has happened for a long time now. They argue that the moment a person comes to really understand the meaning of free will, and which has to entail sustenance the moral responsibility sense, the person will observe that free will and determinism can coexist comfortably-if at all determinism refers to what the scientists finally settled on(Harris, 2012, p.691). Proceeding on, incompatibilities kind of base their hopes on indeterminism, and this notion met a cheering welcome when it was launched by the physics of the 20th century. Perhaps can provide for itself some undetermined quantum swerves at the level of sub-atom, and eventually evade the physical law shackles! Or maybe there could be some other way to truly undetermined our choices. Some have gone to the extent of naming this phenomenon as ‘agent causation’; whose case implies that all free choices are due to an agent, but not because of any event within that agent’s history. One advocator for this position named Roderick Chisholm frankly acknowledged that according to this viewpoint any free choice is but a “little miracle”, a reason as to why it is embraced by it is that school of thought highly embraced by religious philosophers yet shunned by somehow everyone else(Chisholm and Hahn, 1997, p.xxi). Those incompatibilities that presume that people possess free will, so that determinism is considered false, are universally known as libertarians. Incompatibilities who believe that every human choice are determinism of prior events found in their brains to summarize from this statement that it is impossible to have free will, and therefore, are in no way responsible to our actions(Chisholm and Hahn, 1997, p.xxiii). MichioKaku (YouTube, 2015), a Theoretical Physicist, from his YouTube presentation about “Why Physics Ends the Free Will Debate” has much to add into the topic of determinism-indeterminism. He argues that determinism-indeterminism implies the universe as a clock, some huge clock that has been ticking from time immemorial, according to the Newton’s laws of motion. This means that whatever a person would eat has been predetermined in this clock and you cannot change it. That it was fixed as par Newton’s laws of motion. Einstein believed in the same theory and so was a determinist (YouTube, 2015). Then he questions whether a mass murderer can really be said to be guilty if in case his action was fixed billions of years prior to his existence? Does it mean that their actions even the worst of all as is actions had already been preordained millions of years ago? In response to this question, Einstein says that indeed their actions were all predetermined to some extent. But he adds a statement. Einstein suggests that they should still be jailed, however. Heisenberg, Kaku continues, comes along and proposes the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Heisenberg considers Einstein’s view and calls it nonsense, as the action could be spread anywhere, not fixed. This idea does not sound attractive to Einstein as he personally claimed that God doesn’t play dies. He encourages Einstein to get used to the new truth. Einstein was wrong and God played dies. To arouse him, Heisenberg refers him to the electron which is fixed in any one position (YouTube, 2015). What does this knowledge tell us about free will? This means that in some sense we shall have some kind of free will. It tells us that no one can determine your future events, same to one’s past history. There is always uncertainty in everything that we do. He then gives an illustration of himself. He says that suppose he looks at himself at the mirror, the person is not him. It is not really him today, tomorrow or in the future to come. It is not really him. It is him a billionth of a second ago; because it takes a billionth second to have light move from him to the mirror and then back to his eye (YouTube, 2015). This concern regarding indeterminism varieties is out of place, comment the compatibilists: free will, they say, is a feature that needs neither determinism nor indeterminism; and to solve the free will problem lies in knowing this, not relying on quantum physicists to succeed with the right physics, or a miracle. Compatibilism is the most embraced view among philosophers (about 60% from the 2009 Phil papers survey) with libertarians as runner-up with 13% and eventually hard determinists at just 12% (Kooy, 2012, pp.19-21). Many of the cited scientists fall in the category of the position rejected by most of philosophers; possibly because these scientists rarely ever considered compatibilist viewpoint or opinions in its favor (Kooy, 2012, pp.19-21). Compatibilism is valued at nothing, says Sam, other than this assertion of the next creed: A puppet is free to the extent that you love its strings. This, however, has not sparked any discussion much less its support from compatibilism discussion. In a way Sam (Harris, 2012, p.685) has missed one among the deepest points put forth by Von Neumann and Morgenstern as they introduced their ground-breaking 1953 book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. On this note, Sam Harris (Harris, 2012, p.685) gives an example also mentioned by Dennett. When sunlight reflected by a ripe apple makes to decide and reach out to the fruit, then pick it off, can’t I say by that I am under the control of the master puppeteer, Captain Worldaroundme. 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