Victor Victien

Question 1 The object of this project is to recreate the fatal airplane crash of Flight LNI610 (PK-LQP) the focus of this essay is on how I might have conducted an accident investigation using real data and scientific tools, including airspeed, attitude, pressure, acceleration, force, dynamic pressure, Mach number, density, mass, momentum, etc. These are some of the fundamental tools used by professional crash investigators to determine what caused the crash. Methodology, to reconstruct a modern jet aircraft from its computer recorder and parts recovered at the scene. My work should prove helpful to both flight simulation enthusiasts and professionals interested in aviation accident investigations. Note: If you’re wondering about why I chose this aircraft to recreate in simulation, there’s a short video at the end of this post that answers that question. My methodology was as follows: (1) use only aerodynamic and inertial sources for control surfaces and spoilers to reproduce all normal modes and rates; (2) control systems for engines, wings, tail surfaces, landing gear, flaps, ailerons, elevators, and rudder are reproduced as static springs; (3) input thrust from engines is supplied by two open loop constant output forces which represent pure lift or drag (wind tunnels will supply actual lift or drag values if needed); (4) For lateral motion the controls simulate propellers with linear servo actuators for rudder and elevator; for pitch and yaw they simulate variable angle rotor blades with proportional-integral-derivative controllers; (5) model engine temperature based on wind tunnel values for thrust setting and ambient temperature; (6) calculations are to be based on reference coordinates as set forth in NASA FAI Design Standards 3-05b-03 & 4-01a-02 for precision gliders. A few facts and theories regarding the incident are summarized here, along with recommendations for further study. The thesis presented here was based on interviews with many former employees of Boeing and National Transportation Safety Board personnel, along with records obtained from several public sources. Although only certain factual information can be presented, some other parts of the accident could not be evaluated due to time limitations. The opinions expressed here are not those of Boeing or any other manufacturer, but rather represent those of the author. The final conclusion drawn by the author is that there are no easy answers to questions relating to Flight LNI610 (PK-LQP). Therefore, future studies should focus on gaining more understanding of how modern systems react to aerodynamic loads, especially considering their multi-modal performance. An examination of different modes of operation should also be conducted to determine how multiple operational constraints interact with one another and determine if this interaction is sufficient to provide safety margins during different phases of flight. These issues must be examined carefully as they will probably form the basis for investigations into accidents such as this one. Finally, it is clear that safety remains a concern in modern commercial aircraft operations. Future efforts should therefore include studies that further explore safety margin improvements that have been identified from previous investigations and lessons learned from incidents involving similar accidents and situations. Some conclusions may appear obvious in retrospect, but investigators can learn valuable lessons by making simple analyses and reaching informed conclusions based on careful consideration of evidence. In 2008, there were 1,487 fatalities among general aviation pilots in the United States. This represents a record high since 1950. Recent estimates suggest that these deaths could have been prevented with technology available today. We seek to develop and demonstrate an experimental research study on fuel system damage tolerance testing in which human factors engineering principles are applied to identify problems in avionics design that contribute to loss of life in general aviation accidents. Our results may inform subsequent FAAregulatory rulemaking efforts and also help reduce losses due to general aviation accidents. As we cannot develop or implement regulations without significant funding, our study will likely involve substantial time and resources from industry and academic researchers, thus leading to large impacts on safety in general aviation. Because this project has implications for all users of aircraft systems, including government agencies, academia, and industry, it has attracted attention from both academic and industrial organizations. Consequently, it is possible that our work may be subject to patents or restricted trade secrets. Question 2 Part 1 Many possible questions arise as a result of this accident, among them: why did the captain choose to keep the thrust high for such a long time? What caused the stall and why did the pilots turn off the engines? Why did the aircraft continue to dive for some time? These questions have been asked many times before and answered differently by different individuals. The captain was already known to have followed certain tactics that would benefit him financially in the case of an accident. As far as we know, there were no new occurrences on this flight that might have been expected to trigger such reactions. We propose an alternative hypothesis based on previous events that may have influenced the crew’s decisions, specifically those related to technical events and failures on the flight deck. Our thesis is that these factors caused the pilots to fail to recognize that the performance of the aircraft was worsening due to structural damage caused by inadequate loading conditions, with consequences for both safety and economical efficiency. These findings imply that we need to question our preconceived notion of what happened during the crash, in terms of cause and blame. A deeper understanding of human performance under adverse conditions could contribute to reducing human error and preventing accidents. Research report prepared for degree course (ECTS 6). Credit value 6.3 ECTS, workload 18 ECTS, difficulty rating 9/10, attendance 0 ECTS, average grade 7.8 ECTS Get access to your personal information. Crew's decision was critical in causing a sudden loss of power and death of 2709 passengers & 7 crew members on board, making it the worst disaster in aviation history. An incident on ground has been conducted which should clarify some important issues for accident investigation. These events provide necessary context to interpret and evaluate the critical issues identified by this paper. The first event concerns ground training procedures. All pilot, co-pilot and flight engineer instructors participated in ground simulation exercises with other instructor pilots and a pilot flight simulator that reproduce all phases of flight and certain phases of emergencies, except landing. Training had two components: technical training (static engine system), emergency response training (landing) and routine operating procedures training ((landing). The next event concerns air operations during take -off. Although fuel capacity on board was reduced for reasons unknown, its operational limitations did not require refuelling prior to take-off. This issue has been corrected since then. Ground facilities have also been upgraded since then. During take-off a relatively minor procedural change had been implemented: due to very cold conditions at Toulouse airport, we were instructed to reduce power setting from ILS Cat I (CAT IIIa) to CAT I (CAT Ia) prior to starting our engines. As CAT Ia provides insufficient thrust for Cat IIIa operation, power setting should have been retracted before start of engines. Despite our attempts to adhere to these procedures, one engine failed after starting at Toulouse, followed by another failure while climbing at high altitude. A radio communication had been performed with ATC before this second failure which allowed for adequate safety management in such an unusual situation. After both failures the captain requested descent at which time the aircraft accelerated into a near stall at high altitude, until reaching around 25 degrees pitch angle, when it abruptly accelerated upwards again to 10 degrees pitch angle, leading to overstressing the wings and destruction of the aircraft. To analyse this particular case we compared all available evidence with what could be expected if no serious deficiencies existed in procedures or in equipment, considering possible improbable variations in factors affecting each item. It is therefore apparent that aircraft mishaps are more complex than many assume and must be investigated as such. Some investigation efforts will involve full accident data collection while others will rely on accident witnesses' descriptions of flight details and systems operation. Part 2 The accident of Flight LNI610 (PK-LQP) is not the first time Malaysia Airlines has had a significant number of commercial flights being significantly delayed or even cancelled because of bad weather conditions. The ATR 72 family aircraft are well equipped for such circumstances and would generally fly safely under such weather conditions if crew competence and experience were good. Unfortunately, there were failures in both these areas on the night of 15th July, 2014. The failure of crew competence occurred with the inappropriate decisions made by the captain to maintain his intended route despite strong indications of bad weather ahead. In addition, his incorrect use of cockpit systems resulted in poor situational awareness and misinterpretation of aircraft position. This left the flight crew exposed to difficult weather conditions with potentially severe consequences. The second major error was that of poor communication between the flight crew, especially during the take-off roll and final approach to Runway 22L. As a result, there was confusion on how to proceed in light of deteriorating weather conditions. These two events lead to the tragic loss of all 298 lives aboard Flight LNI610 (PK-LQP). In this paper, we aim to address two main issues: 1) Did the pilot flying misinterpret his visual perception? 2) Were the procedures correctly performed by the flight crew? We suggest that these were both errors made by the pilot flying due to lack of situational awareness and inability to assess his situation properly. These mistakes led to him becoming too slow in determining a correct decision for landing and as a result he became overly exposed to adverse Question 3 The Boing 737-8 (the Max) should never have been certified by the FAA. Introduction 1. The current scandal and controversy surrounding the safety of the Boeing 737-8 (the Max) aircraft can be attributed to its “black box” not having been tested adequately for critical faults, as revealed by preliminary results from investigations of a fatal crash of a Lion Air flight on October 29, 2018, which resulted in the loss of all 189 passengers and crew members on board. Although no similarities can be established between the two crashes at this stage, many critics and aviation safety experts are urging for an investigation into whether there are more similar issues with the design of the aircraft’s ‘black box’ as well as further examination of other safety issues associated with the 737-8. This paper will discuss whether or not these arguments are valid and suggest alternative solutions to mitigate potential flaws in the design of the aircraft’s ‘black box’ to make it safer for its passengers. 2. There is much criticism regarding the quality of design standards that were employed during the certification of the Boeing 737-8 (the Max). It is worth mentioning that although all aspects of aircraft safety are interdependent, only those aspects directly relating to flight performance are normally tested in accordance with standards published by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). For example, testing procedures relating to operational controls such as rudder pedals, cockpit lighting, avionics systems, systems monitoring, and alarms were only subject to voluntary inspections during the flight test programme conducted for the 737-8 (the Max). Additionally, most parts of the aircraft that would contribute to a possible risk were also subject to mandatory tests for part approval but not necessarily final testing before installation in the aircraft. Thus, even if there were any structural defects or problems with manufacturing processes that could contribute to a possible hazard during flight, they would only be detected after an accident has occurred. Thus, only when accidents happen do many people realise that some key elements of aircraft safety may have been overlooked or compromised. 3. In July 2016, Boeing stated that it had implemented additional procedures and checks following a separate 2015 issue regarding fuel lines on its 787 Dreamliner aircraft, resulting in another worldwide grounding of its fleet. This involved testing procedures for composite fuel tanks and sealant injectors on certain models of the aircraft and involves over 1400 component part types. Boeing further disclosed that there had been more than 20 additional “fuel leak” events involving different model Boeing 787s from 2005 to 2015. Although these incidents did not involve fatalities, they nevertheless highlighted deficiencies in Boeing’s Quality Assurance program and increased scrutiny was imposed by regulatory authorities around the world on its maintenance practices. The number of defects found during manufacturing was low compared to other industries but inspections are required every 12 months on average by airworthiness authorities around the world for new airplanes as well as every 180 days for existing airplanes. In addition, several previous instances of major structural failures involving other types of Boeing airplanes were found during production testing which included those related to carbon fibre/epoxy parts on the 787 Dreamliner, but this type of event does not require re-inspection of previously built airplanes. In March 2017, following reports that inspections had identified flaws in certain welds in the fuel system, a total of 45 US airlines grounded their Boeing 737 MAX 8 fleets due to concerns about potential risks with the plane’s anti-stall system. As a result, US aviation regulators ordered all operators of the plane to remove it from service until modifications could be made to software linked to the system. It was subsequently reported that one such problem may have led to a crash in Indonesia in October 2018, leading to further discussions in the United States Congress over whether and how the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should oversee certification of commercial aircraft. On October 26, 2018, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed after takeoff from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport, killing all 157 people on board. Initial investigations revealed that a safety feature that can automatically push the nose of the plane down if sensors detect a dangerous condition called an aerodynamic stall may have been enabled during the flight. In this case, however, it appears that pilots did not know how to turn off the safety feature and therefore followed proper procedures when it should have been disabled. As a result, investigators believe that an uncommanded automatic nose-down input by the MCAS function caused Part 2 I agree This is because: Pilot error/improper operation by Boeing Authorization of manufacturer's technical procedures for operation, evaluation and limitations. Reason 2. Aviation security loopholes. Reason 3. Non-operational ability of ground software for known critical failures, such as crossfeed It would allow erroneous commands to be entered into the flight deck by untrained personnel, such as those assigned to training airlines or used in parts testing, without correcting this obvious problem. Reason 4. Untested development procedures for many complex functions that required computer interfacing with systems from another company, causing weaknesses in certification testing of new systems and associated equipment. Reason 5. Failures in production system testing were not addressed and documented adequately, with problems discovered late in production that had already caused $billion damage to customers and airline shareholders. Reason 6. Airline involvement with an airworthiness authority that was highly subject to political pressures and corruption. Reason 7. Incorrect specification of MTOW, reducing payload capability and increasing landing distance from specifications that had been made public before final certification of the design. Reason 8. Significant inaccuracies in stress analysis data on important structural components of the airplane, preventing valid design predictions from being made and compromising aircraft performance and reliability. Reason 9. Ignorance of effects of using type materials. Question 4 They have better culture The culture at Lion Air is influenced by corporate social responsibility (CSR) because of its nature to be based on achieving certain goals, resulting in operational excellence and strategic business success. The management systems such as business improvement plans (BIP), work force competency matrix (WFM), strategy formulation process (SPF), audit system, governance structure, value creation mechanism, incentive compensation scheme, management incentives, workforce structure, functional role assignment, resource deployment and investment prioritization all serve as part of CSR management system. The philosophy of managing human capital at Lion Air in relation to risk mitigation is unique and further support the strength of its CSR approach. In terms of how its employees’ interests are being addressed, there is evidence of participation and a level of autonomy that allow employees to take actions for corporate betterment. Lion Air’s core values are positively correlated with their employee behaviour. This research demonstrates that there is a clear relationship between core values and employees’ satisfaction at work. This implies that when the company operates based on core values, employee performance will improve and service quality will increase. Thus, this paper argues that if Lion Air succeeds in keeping its core values intact, then it can help them succeed in creating an environment where employee well-being is ensured and organizational effectiveness will be improved. The Philosophy of Managing Human Capital at Lion Air in Relation to Risk Mitigation is Unique As stated earlier, management philosophy has been proven to affect organisational effectiveness. However, it has been found that only two forms of philosophy were influential on performance: top-down or centralised philosophy and decentralised or open philosophy. One way to ensure effective risk mitigation is by integrating all aspects of management into a system which also ensures compliance with internal policies and external regulations. An organisation must incorporate three types of factors into their decision-making processes: qualitative, quantitative and analytic. Based on these three components, one can derive how much each aspect contributes to overall organisational performance. It has been shown that top-down management with limited integration into other areas is ineffective at improving organisational performance, while decentralised management systems tend to provide less cohesion within the organisation. An effective risk management system would be capable of analysing data gathered from several departments in order to develop more holistic views of the organisation and identify potential threats to the company. Such systems require interdepartmental integration in order to generate appropriate action plans for management and implementation. There is no reason why organisations cannot improve upon their current practices by implementing such systems in order to promote greater organisation efficiency. In conclusion, one can observe that effective risk management will only be successful if it incorporates many elements from different disciplines in order to avoid focusing solely on any one particular factor. For example, this means managers must combine top-down with decentralised and analytical philosophies in order to better deal with issues related to human capital management. Additionally, the decision-making process must include an interdepartmental element in order to allow for collaboration across various departments and teams. By providing leadership for an organisation’s Human Capital Management strategy, companies can benefit from a higher degree of compliance with policies and regulations as well as better performance across all business sectors. Question 5 Accident investigation and reporting in general, and how it has been improved over the years is a topic of research. Improving accident investigation in general, has many implications on other aspects of the air transport industry, which will lead to improving aviation safety. There are various efforts made by various international organizations such as ICAO, which includes regulations on the subject. Many aviation organizations in different countries also involve their studies in order to determine their results of accidents and various problems related to it. Most countries do not face serious accidents frequently, but due to high amount of commercial air transport they get higher percentage of fatalities compared to the rest of the world. Although this leads to low amount of fatalities for them, it is still considered a high rate. However, with recent advances in technology, more sophisticated equipments are used for investigating these accidents. Improvements are possible by enhancing its accuracy and understanding, so that improvements can be done more efficiently. Accident investigation reports help people who investigate such accidents and improve their capabilities and experiences in a particular field. Aviation industry involves large number of passengers every year, therefore it has a huge impact on public health. Many airlines suffer major losses due to injuries or deaths caused by these accidents. Therefore, improvement in their process of investigations will reduce this effect and therefore contribute to improved public health. The benefit of safety reports will be effective only if all companies adopt these new ways and procedures for conducting investigations When we carry out an investigation process and providing a report about an accident such as ICAO Annex 13 compliant we assure and enhance safety in aviation in accordance with their obligations under this Convention. The Safety Data Link SYDL has been put in the aircraft for each airport of each country where ICAO member states perform a public service. By establishing the systems and links to gather data from each flight the air navigation service provider can collect information about the pilot, crew, passengers and other members of the public at risk of accidents or errors in operations. With this data collected it will be possible to reduce errors in air traffic control operations, create better designs for new systems and enable human factors studies to prevent mistakes in flying operations. It is necessary to do more work on risk assessment for individual flights by asking question like why does this particular person/crew fly so much? Does he/she drink too much? Or, did they fly over other aircraft during takeoff or landing? This kind of approach has proved useful for introducing better ways of preventing mistakes in flying operations. A safer world depends on safer air transport, which means reducing accidents to a very low level and enhancing efficiency of the operation of air transport systems. Accident Investigation Reports (AIR) can contribute to reducing accidents in air transport by showing some basic causes that may contribute to accident or mistake in flying operations. These reports have a crucial role in bringing improvement in safety by improving systems design, introducing Human Factors studies, suggesting good policies, evaluating risks and introducing effective measures to eliminate them. A case study was conducted on United Airlines flight 1485 USA-Australia-Fiji (Revised), Airbus A320 with 10 persons onboard (as reported by captain). Flight UA1485 crashed near Essendon Airport Melbourne Australia after technical difficulties caused a temporary divers ion. The Captain had 552 total flying hours with 2 accidents with 2529 takeoffs and 2819 landings (60+3rd in his entire career). As stated above he was from United Airlines which has overall one of the best Safety records of any major US airline, based on my experience as a pilot with American Airlines for 25 years. References Wallin-Pfiffer, M. L. et al. (2004). “From Technology to Organization: Understanding Airline Accident Investigations”. European Business School Research Paper Series (2004). International Association of Airline Transport Pilot Associations (2016). Anonymous. Safety Recommendations for Airlines Based on Investigation Reports:-. Yilmaz, G. A. (2008). “Investigation Report Accident 060790 - Eurocopter AS365N2 EC145”, International Association of Airline Transport Pilot Associations. Benstock, L. F. et al.(2013). “Introduction to Aeronautical Engineering” 6th Edition. McGraw-Hill Companies. IATA Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices (2010). IATA Sharmila Govindamudre-kumar Sharmila Govindamudre-kumarThe Journal of Research in Applied ScienceDOI.