Uzair Sadiq Bilal

 ‘Ditching the Tag of Militancy, Wearing the Tag of Mysticism’ Political Campaign Plan for ST: ‘Sunni Tahreek’ Party. Synopsis of the Party The Sunni Tahreek (ST) is a Sunni religio-organization of Pakistan. The organization was formed on the principles of the Barelvi school of thought in 1990 to counteract what the ST portrays as 'the seizing of the mosques and madrassas of the Barelvi school of thought' by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith gatherings. The idea of re-claiming the mosques and madrassas characterized their fundamental witticism, which was 'Jawaniyan lutaaingai, masjidain bachayeingai [We will yield our lives to secure our mosques]. It is a piece of the Sunni Ittehad Council, a partnership of Barelvi political gatherings. In 2009, the gathering's pioneer, Muhammad Sarwat Ejaz Qadri, additionally shaped the Pakistan Inquilab Tahreek as a political wing of the association. In 2012, the gathering was changed over into a political gathering with the name of Pakistan Sunni Tahreek (PST). The ST showed up in light of the developing impact of Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi associations. The gathering got bolster from Jamat Ahl-e-Sunnat, Anjuman Naojawanan-e-Islam and the pioneers of JUP. Barkati Foundation was subsidizing the ST to defend the privileges of Barelvis. In spite of the support of different gatherings, the ST portrayed itself as non-political association and underlined on the accompanying four focuses: 1. To defend the interests of the Ahl-e-Sunnat 2. To ensure Ahl-e-Sunnat mosques 3. To shield everyday citizens from false convictions 4. Handing over of the Ahl-e-Sunnat mosques and sanctums by the organization to the Barelvis. The ST complained of monopoly over government posts, and religious and government foundations by the Ahle-e-Hadith and Deobandi. The gathering likewise whined about the insignificant portrayal of the Barelvi order. The association was of the conclusion that Ahl-e-Sunnat cannot accomplish their rights till they adopt the same tactics utilized by Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadith associations. The association exhibited it’s initial show of assertion on 18 December 1992 when it sorted out a rally at MA Jinnah Road in Karachi. The motivation behind that rally was to apply weight on the Deobandis to handover Masjid Noor (Ranchorh Line) to it. The rally immediately turned fierce and a few autos were set to flame. Therefore, many individuals were injured and 34 ST specialists were captured. This episode got ST the general population spotlight. After this occurrence, the ST expanded its attack on Ahl-e-Hadith and Deobandi Masjids in Sindh and Punjab. Besides, furnished ST individuals in various parts of Karachi including North Karachi and Baldia Town. In 2002, the ST authority decided during the 2002 elections to adopt a more political nature. The ST likewise chosen to partake in the elections keeping in mind the end goal to serve Ahl-e-Sunnat even in governmental issues. The gathering began its political voyage with tree planting effort in Karachi as a symbolic display of piece. On 11 April 2006, a few top pioneers of ST including leader Abbas Qadri and vice president were killed in a bomb attack amid a gathering at Nishtar Park, Karachi. 57 individuals were slaughtered and 125 people were injured in the attack, which was arranged by Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and SeS. The ST sees MQM as well as Talib (who are from another school of thought, hence the opposition) as the reason behind the attack. In the Nishtar Park massacre, the entire authority of ST was killed, including Shahid Ghauri, Abdur Rehman, Qari Khalil-ur-Rehman, Shahzad Munir, Sarwat Ejaz and Khalid Zia. In the aftermath of the Nishtar Park attack, the association turned to radical means. Political analysts hold that the after the executing of its top authority, the association cannot be viewed as a political outfit any longer. On 28th February 2009, ST's leader Sarwat Ejaz Qadri declared the development of Pakistan Inqilabi Tahreek, the political wing of the gathering. Qadri said that his gathering would proceed with its battle for Muslims and Pakistan. A report put together by Inspector General (IG) Sindh Police to the Supreme Court's Karachi registry incorporated a rundown of 224 target executioners captured since 2007, 38 of which were members of the ST. Out of the 86 suspects, 11 had a place with the ST. ST was viewed as one of the few gatherings complicit in blackmail and violence in Karachi. The exercises of the gathering have been observed for quite a long while. In January 2002, the ST was on the military’s Terrorist Watch List by the then President Gen (R) Pervez Musharraf; their name was removed after the restoration of democracy and they were allowed to contest again. However, the association has stayed under the watch of law authorization and information agencies, especially given their recent support for Mumtaz Qadri. ST strongly criticized the verdict of the ATC (Anti-Terrorism Court) to execute Mumtaz Qadri and termed it as un-Islamic. The party was even willing to pay Rs. 200 million to Taseer’s heirs as blood money. In following years, ST and other link-minded parties continued their protests over the issue of Mumtaz Qadri. After Mumtaz Qadri was hanged. Following his execution, the ST has taken to streets several times to protest the hanging of Taseer’s assassin. On 27th March, around 25,000 people attended the chehlum of Mumtaz Qadri in Rawalpindi's Liaquat Bagh. After which more than 10,000 charged protestors, under the ST’s organized rally, entered the federal capital, damaging buildings and setting fire to the metro station, containers and buses. The protestors, while staging a sit-in in front of Parliament, issued a list of 10 demands under the banner of the Tahreek-i-Labbaik Ya Rasool (SAW). The demands include: 1. The unconditional release of all Sunni clerics and leaders booked on various charges, including terrorism and murder 2. The recognition of Mumtaz Qadri as a martyr 3. The conversion of Qadri’s Adiala Jail cell into a national heritage site 4. The assurances that blasphemy laws will not be amended 5. The removal of Ahmadis and other non-Muslims who are working in government departments. 6. The execution of blasphemy accused Aasia Bibi More than 700 protestors were picked up from different areas of the federal capital and were sent to various jails in Punjab. Four cases were registered against 501 religious workers, including their leadership, under the Anti-Terrorism Act. The four-day sit-in ended after successful negotiation between the federal government and protestors. Now the Tahreek faces a difficult position: their name has been added to the Ranger’s Watch List of 2017 and if they are to recontest this time, they must reorganize themselves politically once again, and restore to their former political ways in the wake of abandoning militant strategies, in ways that can sustain more such successful negotiation between the federal government and protestors. The political analyst Safdal Sial has called this approach “Ditching the tag of Militancy and wearing the tag of Mysticism.” Sial, a research analyst at the Pak Institute for Peace Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank, believes that all religious groups can be equally violent and extremist if one touches their sensitive histories, change can be brought: “So the traditional narratives of the Barelvis (Sunni Tahreek), being followers of Sufism, was peace-loving and moderate. These become irrelevant when one touches blasphemy-related issues [such as Qadri]. The key is to go back” [Sial, 2016]. It is no doubt that the Tahreek has taken note of this, consciously or subconsciously. Their current Facebook “About Me” reads: “Sunni Tahreek is a peacefull religious, political and social organization working in every City of Pakistan. PST has its offices in other countries as well. The objective of this party is to bring peace and stability in Pakistan, and to unite the nation against extremism.” Aims of the Party Originally, the objectives of the party included: 1. Protecting the sanctity of Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 2. Protecting the sanctity of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) 3. Protecting the sanctity of the saints 4. Protecting the mosques of Ahl-e-Sunnat 5. Controlling the Department of Oqaaf (Islamic Affairs) 6. Protecting the rights of Barelvis 7. Protecting the Two-Nation theory Manifesto In January 2012, ST’s leader Muhammad Sarwat Ejaz Qadri announced the conversion of the party into a political party during a rally in Karachi. The party envisions to make a Pakistan an ‘Islamic welfare state’. The party’s chief has said that the party if elected, would work on the welfare of poor people and for extremism-rid Pakistan. The party chief has enumerated four key points of his party's manifesto which include: 1. Education 2. Faith 3. Tolerance 4. Equality The party should, as part of their revised plans, should add to their manifesto that they are willing, as part of their “peace-loving” revisionist strategy, to fight the following: 1. Terrorism 2. Apolitical Organization 3. Militant Organization Visual Rhetorical Devices: 1. New Slogan ‘Ditching the Tag of Militancy, Wearing the Tag of Mysticism’ 2. New Logo Old Logo: New Revised Logo: Concept behind the New Logo: The graphic code of the old logo are hands, a more controlling trope. We recommend displaying this with the whirling dervish, in line with the Barelvi history as a Sufi school of thought. The color code of the first logo, a violent red, has also been replaced with a more minimal and translucent usage of color, to symbolize inclusiveness. This logo must be printed on all the new flags of the party, some of which can be distributed to people in public spaces as merchandise. Reinforcement of the symbolic value of the new flaf is highly important to increase the perception of the value of the product. The political arena is loaded with emotions, values, beliefs, adherences and conflicts, and these should be put to advantage when the Tahreek wants to connect to the people: the key is to redefine the political relationship with the voter from blackmail to mutualist. Epistemic and historical values need to be shifted from being violent to being sympathetic when redefining the relationship between the Tahreek and the voters it wants to win. Primary Rhetorical Devices, with respect to broadening scope of Target Audience Since, the party was formed to promote the Barelvi school of thought of Islam and has more than 200 million followers throughout South Asia – even influencing Sufism and the traditional folk Islam practices, it would be beneficial to capitalize on their history in political messages and speeches, especially bringing the Sufi element in, and use the recent Taliban bombings across Pakistan, to their own advantage, by linking the school of thought that the Taliban follow (Wahhabism) to the idea of violence, and in retrospect, market their own ideology as more endearing. Given the Sufi association, the party can play Naats and Hamds, forms of Sufi music, against the background of their speeches, to accentuate the atmosphere of promoting the Barlevi concept of peace. Following are the departments of the party: Welfare Trust, Ahl-e-Sunnat Khidmat Foundation (Trust) Legal Wing, Justice Islamic Front Student Wing, Islamic Student Federation Islamic Scholar’s Board (Ulma Board) Labour Wing Ladies Wing (Khawateen Wing) Perhaps capitalizing through the form of community-based activities on each of these departments, and linking them to current history is a potential way to generate support for the party. For instance, the event of Eidhi’s death can be used by the Welfare Trust department under this party, in the form of a tribute event, where through dramatic means, mass support can be generating, projecting the party as one that believes in the “true message and peace of Islam” such as charity and welfare. Similarly, the given the recent debates on feminism emerging on the Pakistani political realm, such as the Anti-Domestic Violence Bill on Women last year, it would be interesting to see if community based activities by the Ladies’ Wing under this party can also be organized to have some representation of women’s dialogue in the party, which has heretofore been null, to bring the shift from Public Image to a tailored Intentional Image, for starters. Primary Organizational Devices, with respect to broadening representation in Media Channels The Pakistani Sunni Tahreek’s campaign should now move from mainly being a display of street-power and organizing on grass-roots level (which is in line with the party’s belief that traditional modes of campaign are to be followed as opposed to organizing through a technological uses), and opt for more presence on social and marketing media platforms such as Facebook and twitter – to have a better representations on such platforms which other political parties are avidly using. As such, the party should likely hire a social media person to manage their online political campaign on their otherwise dormant page (https://www.facebook.com/sunni.tehreeek). They have already made some changes to this, for instancing update peace-loving messages on their page, and should continue in this line. This might lead to an ‘adwatch cycle’ effect. Given the Tahreek’s history of violence, audiences may react massively to such ads and media channels may pick this up, imbuing it with more criticism which may obscure the initial intentions of the Tahreek to reclaim their identity. To break this adwatch cycle, the counter-reply by the campaigners of the Tahreek can actually gain more acceptance if they were to participate in an actual political show, to clear their revisionist intentions and rule out any confusions on part of the media and the public. The party has also lacked representation of political talk shows, and are scarcely popular in public imagination, only leading to them being trapped into the vicious adwatch cycle where their campaign becomes self-defeated, given the stigma against their party. For a larger vote [beyond their predefined audience, they should move to registering their names for such shows and make a significant effort at communicating with their audiences, either with these talk shows, or the aforementioned social media platforms. This will drastically help overcome the vicious cycle and once a symbolic message is sent out to the voters through media systems, civic mobilization and political persuasion will see fruition, leading to a change in voting choice. This will be a subtle form of positive propaganda, where the Tahreek’s communicative techniques will seek to manipulate and thus redefine the opinions and attitudes of a targeted audience by striving to change existing belief systems, value structures, and political positions in order to create specific attitudes toward the people of Karachi. Hence, to participate in the media sphere is integral, because only mass media systems can be using to penetrate people’s consciousness on a scale larger to what the Sunni Tahreek has achieved heretofore. We recommend the Tahreek to use polite speeches, quoting messages of love from their Sufi founders, songs including naats and hamds (as they did in Nishtar Park), and posters with the new logo. Some celebrities can be part of this publicity campaign, such as traditional naat and hamd singers such as Ovais Qadri, sufi singers who are famous with the population, to bring a shift in desires. Celebrities, in this respect, will serve as opinion makers as well as opinion leaders, and relegate the attention of the public to the party. Other testimonies from important spokesperson and demonstrators can help, but also, a ‘life stories’ media campaign can also be run, whereby people who have recently won the faith of the party can testify that the Tahreek’s communication attempts have really convinced them that the party has become less radical and more political. ‘Life Stories’ can compare the Tahreek’s warped history with the recent changes, and testify that positive change is happening. Hearing celebrity testimonies as well as from members of their own communities, neighbors, friends, employers, etc, will create more positive stimulus. People from the public are likely to listen and believe their friends and neighbors and may decide to give the Tahreek a second chance themselves. This approach will be ideological in the sense that it will try to “naturalize” specific, stereotypical viewpoints and opinions held against the Tahreek and to let them appear self-evident, logical, sympathetic, and in the public interest. For tactical reasons, the Tahreek’s marketing campaign should take the form of open public discourse or dialogue, but it must always be directed toward diminishing previously defined stereotypes. Events, Music & Merchandising To increase this symbolism,, given that Muhammad Saleem Qadri Shaheed (Rehmat Allh Alaih) - (1990 to 1998), Muhammad Abbass Qadri Shaheed  (Rehmat Allh Alaih) - (1998 to 2006), as well as their avid supporter Mumtaz Qadri, have all been assassinated in the past for being leaders of the party, some of the aforementioned activities can be organized in a way that they coincide on the death anniversaries of these people – and memories of their struggles can be revisited in a dramatic way to accentuate the atmosphere of collective struggle with the people. The campaign, #UniteAgainstTerrorism and #WeAreWithYou, and #CommonFight can be organized around these events on social media, and billboards can be utilized for this, too. Language of the campaign can involve slogans like: “Join us the Sufi way.” to use sympathy and religio-mystic rhetoric of to generate mass support – which is more likely to make them join your party and vote for you. The party should learn from their recent events, of how they have been digging their own pit. For instance, in recent times, after leading the recent four day pro-Mumtaz Qadri sit-ins at Islamabad’s D-Chowk and Karachi’s Numaish Chowrangi, the Sunni Tahreek is seen emerging as a radical group, attracting the aggressive religious activists in a large numbers, which historically, activists of Barelvi groups are comparatively passive in street agitation. This does not help because the party has supporters in a small amount and given their sectarian outlook, that only “Barelvi is the real school of thought and the true spirit of Islam”, they do not form many alliances – even opposing the Taliban. In the end, for quantitative reasons, Barlevi activists end up being arrested for their involvement in criminal activities in the city. Rangers have raided their headquarters several times and confiscated their records. They also interrogated the group’s head, Sarwat Ejaz Qari, and his deputy, Shahid Ghauri, at the Rangers headquarters during the latter’s “brief detention”. This ‘From Defenders of mosques to Militants’ now calls for desperate revision. While the Tahreek has been operating as both, as a religious group presenting the Barelvi school of thought and at the same time, a militant group fighting with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the rival sect-based groups, particularly the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat, and the Taliban – it would now be intelligent to choose one, and organize, to avoid conflict of interest. Owais Tohid, a senior journalist familiar with the workings of religious parties, said the Tahreek in the beginning used the slogan “Jawaniyan lutaain gai, masjidain bachayein gai [“We will sacrifice our lives to protect our mosques]”, but recently, the group started following the trend of radicalisation, making it difficult to differentiate between “them and jihadist groups,”, Analysts believe Barelvi groups; especially the Tahreek, have started politically exploiting the issue of blasphemy and the execution of Qadri has provided them with an opportunity to show their strength to counter the growing influence of Deobandi and Ahle Hadith groups in the country. However, we would advise the Tahreek, as many political analysts have done in the past, to return to the the traditional narratives of the Barelvis being followers of Sufism, peace-loving and moderate” [a recommendation the political analyst Alix Philipson also makes in “The role of Sufism in the Identity Construction, Mobilization and Political activism of the Barelwi movement in Pakistan.” PACO1, no. 7 (2014)] This should be marketed under a brand-new campaign called “New Leadership, New Beginnings”, and the Tahreek should probably hire a PR company to do this, and market a brand-new image of them, as the party “returning to their peaceful roots”, drawing upon the Prophet’s tradition to “forgive [your] enemies and start anew”. At the same time, fear can play a role in political mobilization – but not radical violent, fear, but perhaps a more hegemonic one, one involving religious sentiment, not armed violence. In this way, the strategy will be a mix of strategizing through ‘acclaim spots’ [by making positive claims about the ideology of the party as Sufi the idea of former glory in history], and focusing input and novelty, rather than demonizing the opponents – the State, MQM, etc. The idea will be to ‘Make it Known’, call to attention the positivity of the party, which will lead to desire and memorialization ‘Make it Feel’, and hopefully lead to action, make the voters ‘act’. Memorialization of times when the party was less radical and more political, so to say, would also ease some of the tensions between the party and the State. In 2002, the then president Gen (retd) Pervez Musharraf announced that the Tahreek was being placed on the watch list – perhaps marketing oneself as peaceful may help with this. The Sunni Tahreek should not stand in line with the other five other extremist groups - the Jaish-e-Mohammad, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, the Tahreek-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Tanzeem Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi – their history separates them from the other radical parties, and they should now form their alliances. Memorialization of historically more peaceful days will help them de-identify with other militant groups. This would also fix some of the differences from within the party, and achieve more unity and collectivism; for example, Ejaz Sarwat Qadri of the Tahreek heads the more powerful faction of the group, which has recently renamed itself as the Pakistan Sunni Tahreek, while Muhammad Bilal Qadri, the son of the Tahreek founder Saleem Qadri, is slightly less violent and has formed his own faction after developing differences with Sarwat Ejaz Qadri and other leaders – the polarized outlook 0n the party, whether it is truly radical to truly peace-loving, is not a public perception, then, but is a difference of opinion within the party – those such as S. Ejaz from within the party believe that they should now reform, and form the right alliances. This explains why, forming a sort of anti-Taliban alliance, at least 50 Barelvi school of thought groups have demanded the government declare extremists as well as their own supporters, whether political or religious, as enemies of the state and traitors – and atone the party of their history, promising that the party will openly declare their non-affiliation with other militant groups. The demand came at a multi-party conference held under the banner of Tahaffuz Namoos-i-Risalat Mahaz in early 2017. The party invited MQM leader Abdul Haseeb, Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen leader Nasir Abbas Sherazi and a PML-Q delegation participated on special invitation, and following was the statement issued by one party leader: “Patronizing and supporting the Taliban should be declared a serious crime against the state and those found guilty of the criminal act be dealt with an iron hand and given exemplary punishment to eliminate militancy from the country.” Opposing talks with the Taliban, the party sought closure of the dialogue chapter for good since, what it said, the policy had badly failed and that an all-out war was the only option to establish peace. The conference decided to launch a countrywide “Go Taliban Go” drive and observe Friday (Feb 28) as the Anti-Taliban day, and should now continue this campaign. Welcoming the support for army operation by the MQM, MWM, PML-Q and Tehrik-i-Insaf, the Tahreek can align itself as a political group rather than a militant one, now, and remarket itself: ‘attack spots’ will be bare and minimum. This would also allow differences from within the party to dissolve. Perhaps the more violent fractions from within the party will see that the peaceful fractions are gaining political support and also abandon their militant practices in lieu of reformative ones. This will allow the fractions from within the party to dissolve, letting it operate as a composite whole once again. Concluding Remarks: Political Marketing Strategists believe this is the only way forward – to come clean, and to strategically organize now, not in a militant, but in a political fashion. Bordering the party from political realms and operating on the peripheries as a militant group will not solve the problem of the party’s lack of representation in the political realm. It first must redefine itself as a group with political aspirations, not militant ones, and reconstruct their personas in the minds of the people of Pakistan – as a party willing to come to talk shows and communicate by using the same modalities as their counterparts – in short, reconstructing the image that they are hear not to kill, but to participate. A visual summary of how our strategies will effectively work in unison: REFERENCES: Olivier Roy and Antoine Sfeir, The Columbia World Dictionary of Islamism, pg. 275. Colombia University Press, 2007. Daily News Of Work In Rawalpindi Todays Update.23-APR-2012. History. Retrieved on 6th December 2013. Retrieved from: http://strwp.weebly.com/ Muhammad Saleem Qadri Shaheed (R.A.) retrieved on 6th December 2013. Retrieved from;http://pstislamabad.blogspot.com/p/muhammad-saleem-qadri-shaheed.html Sarwat Ejaz Qadri. Onepakistan. Retrieved on 6th December 2013. Retrieved from; http://topics.onepakistan.com.pk/sarwat-ejaz-qadri/ N. C. 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Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Fall 2009, 14-16. san-pips.com/download.php?f=161.pdf • Shehzad, Muhammad. “On dangerous grounds.” The Friday Times24, no. 20 (December 14-20, 2012). http://www. thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=-&page=7 • http://pstislamabad.blogspot.com/p/introduction.html Philippon, Alix. “The role of Sufism in the Identity Construction, Mobilization and Political activism of the Barelwi movement in Pakistan.” PACO1, no. 7 (2014): 152-169. http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco/article/ view/13757/12134 Philippon, Alix. “The role of Sufism in the Identity Construction, Mobilization and Political activism of the Barelwi movement in Pakistan.” PACO1, no. 7 (2014): 152-169. http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco/article/ view/13757/12134 Philippon, Alix. “The role of Sufism in the Identity Construction, Mobilization and Political activism of the Barelwi movement in Pakistan.” PACO1, no. 7 (2014): 152-169. http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco/article/ view/13757/12134 Sunni Tahreek’s political ambition.” Dawn, March 26, 2012. http://www.dawn.com/news/705439/sunni-Tahreekspolitical-ambition Sunni Tahreek is now a political party.” Pakistan Today, January 30, 2012. http://www.pakistantoday.com. 10 www.cscr.pk pk/2012/01/30/national/sunni-Tahreek-is-now-a-political-party/ Shehzad, Mohammad. "On Dangerous Grounds." The Friday Times, December 14-20, 2016. http://www. thefridaytimes.com/beta3/tft/article.php?issue=-&page=7 http://pstislamabad.blogspot.com/p/political-activities.html Islamic Parties In Pakistan.” International Crisis Group, December 12, 2011. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/ Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/216%20Islamic%20Parties%20in%20Pakistan.pdf Rangers issue details of detained Sunni Tahreek activists.” Dawn, June 23, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/ news/- Rathore, Mujtaba, Masror Hausen, Amir Rana, Safdar Sial, and Abdul Mateen. "Profiling the Violence in Karachi." Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Fall 2009, 14-16. san-pips.com/download.php?f=161.pdf • Philippon, Alix. “The role of Sufism in the Identity Construction, Mobilization and Political activism of the Barelwi movement in Pakistan.” PACO1, no. 7 (2014): 152-169. http://siba-ese.unisalento.it/index.php/paco/article/ view/13757/12134 Rehman, Ziaur. “Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tahreek.” The News, April 02, 2016. http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/109639-Ditching-the-tag-of-mysticism-Barelvi-militancy-rearshead-in-form-of-Sunni-Tahreek http://dunyanews.tv/en/ Pakistan/--alleged-target-killers-arrested-after-2011-SC • Intelligence agencies prepare list of 86 key suspects.” Express Tribune, November 19, 2015. http://tribune.com.pk/ story/994257/intelligence-agencies-prepare-list-of-86-key-suspects/ • Incidents and Statements involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan:-.” SATP. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm One killed as Jamaat-ud-Dawa and Sunni Tahreek fight over mosque.” Express Tribune, July 2, 2011. http://tribune. com.pk/story/200553/one-killed-as-jamaat-ud-dawa-and-sunni-Tahreek-fight-over-mosque/ Incidents and Statements involving Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan:-.” SATP. http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/SSP_tl.htm Sunni Tahreek, SSP clash leaves two dead.” Daily Times, August 19, 2011. http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/ main/19-Aug-2011/sunni-Tahreek-ssp-clash-leaves-two-dead • Rangers raid ST office, seize arms.” Dawn, September 11, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/news/658307/rangers-raidst-office-seize-arms Khan, Faraz. “Drastic measures: Sunni Tahreek, ASWJ offices in New Karachi demolished.” Express Tribune, October 15, 2011. http://tribune.com.pk/story/273902/karachi-search-operation-offices-of-sunni-Tahreek-banned-outfitsdemolished/ Sunni Tehrik leaders arrested, while Karachi is gripped by fear, again.” Express Tribune, October 7, 2011. Khan, Faraz. “Dozens arrested as Rangers raid Sunni Tahreek Karachi office.” Express Tribune, June 18, 2015. Khan, Faraz. “Rangers raid Sunni Tahreek office again, confiscate records.” Express Tribune, June 21, 2015. Rangers detain Sunni Tahreek leaders, claims party spokesman.” June 22, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/ news/-/rangers-detain-sunni-Tahreek-leaders-claims-party-spokesman Rangers issue details of detained Sunni Tahreek activists.” Dawn, June 23, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/ news/- CTD arrests three Sunni Tahreek ‘target killers’.” The News, July 07, 2015. http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/49878- ctd-arrests-three-sunni-Tahreek-target-killers • Junaid Jamshed’s attacker arrested in Karachi.” Daily Times, April 07, 2016. http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ pakistan/07-pr-16/junaid-jamsheds-attacker-arrested-in-karachi • Ibid. Rehman, Ziaur. “Ditching the tag of mysticism, Barelvi militancy rears head in form of Sunni Tahreek.” The News, April 02, 2016. http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/109639-Ditching-the-tag-of-mysticism-Barelvi-militancy-rearshead-in-form-of-Sunni-Tahreek Sunni Tahreek rejects capital punishment to Mumtaz Qadri.” Dawn, October 1, 2011. http://www.dawn.com/ news/663094/sunni-Tahreek-rejects-capital-punishment-to-mumtaz-qadri Sit-in staged for review of Mumtaz Qadri’s conviction in Karachi.” Dawn, November 21, 2015. http://www.dawn. com/news/- Pakistan hangs Mumtaz Qadri for murder of Salman Taseer .” Al Jazeera, February 29, 2016. http://www.aljazeera. com/news/2016/02/pakistan-hangs-anti-blasphemy-law-governor-assassin-.html Pro-Qadri protesters given the night to disperse on their own: Nisar .” Dawn, March 29, 2016. http://www.dawn. com/news/- Red Zone sit-in by pro-Qadri demonstrators ends after successful negotiations .” Dawn, March 30, 2016. http:// www.dawn.com/news/-/red-zone-sit-in-by-pro-qadri-demonstrators-ends-after-successful-negotiations