15.2 Peru vs. Myanmar
Anna Paige Mendenhall
“A. Paige”
Cell:-, Skype: apmendenhall639-1467 Matthews Mill Pond Rd.
Angier, NC, US 27501
Bio:
A. Paige is the typical millennial vagabond you expect to see camping across deserts, in dense
mountain forests, and across icy lakes. “Teach, Research, Travel,” has been the motto in these
extreme environs for the past four years, and A. Paige uses these experiences now to transport
readers. As a burgeoning American ghost writer with talents ranging from the academic to the
narrative, A. Paige loves to show parallels between the real, and the imagined, by explaining and
demonstrating the complexities and symbolic pieces of reality.
Diversity Relations and the Role of the
State in Post-Conflict Reconstruction
in Peru and Myanmar
Introductory Context
Post-conflict reconstruction and conflict prevention efforts are noble areas of study and
implementation. There has yet been a standardized method to understanding, managing and
preventing conflict that benefits the people and the state to maintain and develop a functioning
framework for governance. The necessity of an operable state is conjunctive to the determination
and will of a grieved people achieving desirable and feasible outcomes. Peru and Myanmar offer
unique temporal analysis to conflict and post-conflict governance that may be helpful to
ascertain current efforts and mitigate potential administrative follies within the role of the state.
The conflicts associated with Peru and Myanmar that will be under microscope, are equally
ideological, but have a respective list of grievances, contextual similarities and dissimilarities
that change how the conflict is perceived and studied.
Peru is home to the illustrious Machu Picchu and was part of the largest American empire before
the invasion of conquistadors and the implementation of a colonial administration. There was a
significant level of inequality that persisted even after independence finally took hold within the
country when a general declared Lima liberated in 1821, not really consolidating that power until
1824 (Brosseder 2014). Thereafter, inequality and political instability was a recurring theme of
the nation while it went back and forth between authoritarian and democratic governments,
sparking the interests of most of the nation to form and follow the Shining Path, a communist
insurgent group following tactics that are reminiscent of Mao’s own guerrilla tactics. Shining
Path became more and more violent over time, which forced the government to declare a state of
emergency in 1981. This escalated into acts of internal irregular warfare with the Shining Path
only becoming more encouraged to fight the state and kill indiscriminately as it moved around
the country, sometimes even forcing child soldiers to help with their cause. Then under the
administration of Fujimori when he installed an authoritarian regime to take a hard line approach
against the insurgents, he utilized an extensive and strategic intelligence service as well as more
of the military’s capabilities effectively against the Shining Path that was receiving support from
external actors, but the insurgent group was forced to retreat to the jungles and only perform
small scale attacks (CVR 2003). There were beginnings of a reconciliation process within the
country after Fujimori resigned from a decade long corrupted position, until Shining Path
resurfaced violently again in 2002, forcing a military response in 2014 (Gregory 2009 & Riestra
and Gustavo 2015).
Myanmar is part of the wondrous region of Southeast Asia and home to several indigenous
groups, coming under the governance of various empires until it was invaded in the 18th century
by British forces and effectively becoming a colony until it gained independence and
contemporary borders in 1948. Strife and political instability are normal affairs for the nation
having seen various phases of insurgencies and transitional governments (Charney 2009). What
can be noted is how those insurgencies changed from political to ethnic over the decades in the
20th century until the 1988 uprising garnered attention for political and ethnic grievances as well
as economic. Aung San Suu Kyi became a prominent icon after this uprising, especially when
her political party was not recognized by the military junta as the winner of the national elections
in 1990. What followed was further insurgent attacks and severe government retaliation, forcing
hundreds of thousands of refugees to flee until the second process of reconciliation came to an
end and during 2010 when various political prisoners were released (Grundy, et al 2014).
Through this long conflict, there have been accusations of using child soldiers and encouraging
human rights violations in so far as genocide, but the record may end with the conflict as
government reforms since 2011 have only shown a brief promise for a better future within the
state (Huang 2013).
With these brief introductions to a far more elaborate piece of history, there are some relative
similarities, especially in regards to governance. Peru and Myanmar have a wealth of
information on irregular warfare, political movements, marginalized groups and post-conflict
reconstruction. With this unique position, this is why it is useful to peruse these conflicts with a
hope to better comprehend and formalize reconstruction efforts in other locations around the
Pacific Ocean and elsewhere. To look more narrowly in this context, it is important to
understand the role of the state and its relations with indigenous groups. Indigenous groups have
historically been marginalized. By ascertaining their grievances and achievements in Peru and
Myanmar, it will be easier to scrutinize whether or not the system of governance within the
respective countries are a ticking time bomb for another potential conflict or have been mitigated
to minor instances of grievances by working within a feasible and desirable framework that has
answered not only to the elites and the masses, but to the marginalized too. Due to the elaborate
context of this research, this essay is more of a brief that will compare the years after each
respective conflict with a tentative grasp on contemporary relations between the state and
indigenous groups.
State and Peace
Typically when a state exercises control, it is exercising its legitimate right to protect its
sovereignty. This comes under critique when an insurgency arises and acts against the state for
so long. Social perception, federalism and regional-district interdependence are a few measures
to govern legitimacy by. When a measure like social perception is under threat, then the power
within the region becomes susceptible to factions of interest. When relations then grow violently
and power shifted, then securing legitimacy becomes a concern (Chesterman, et al 2005). This
concern can be mitigated in various fashions and the ending developed based on those actors of
importance within the factions of interest. Then it can be assumed a state would naturally have to
be willing at a certain point to desire the end of a conflict within its borders and will look
towards preventative measures. When working in an environment that offers little room for
negotiations due to insurgents own perceptions of government and how to achieve a status quo,
the state will move towards positive or negative peace efforts. Positive peace encourages a more
diligent, tolerable and sustainable outcome for the state with the end of a conflict and negative
peace requires simply for the end of conflict. One is typically the precursor to the other and in
contemporary settings, it is all the states of Peru and Myanmar can work with and that is to find a
final negative peace effort so that the states can move forward. Yet by narrowing the process of
the framework, its influences and considerations of importance, it could negatively affect
post-conflict efforts (Lupovici 2013).
The Incas and various other smaller indigenous groups suffered greatly from foreign disease,
socioeconomic changes and decades of fighting soon assimilating into the Spanish culture
through forced and sometimes violent religious conversion (Moran 2010). Although increasingly
becoming an equal part of society, most of the indigenous population was a target of
socio-political issues. It is estimated from the observations of the Truth and Reconciliatory
Commission in Peru after the escalation of the conflict between the 1980s-1990s that almost half
of the individuals that died or disappeared in the conflict were committed by the Shining Path, a
third committed by Fujimori’s intelligence service and the rest are assumed to be committed by
other non-state actors. Over 75% of all deaths and disappearances, whether intentional or not,
were against native groups (CVR 2003). This disregard for the indigenous communities played
even through the Commission since it was essentially a device to reconstruct democratic
institutions through the focus of individual crimes and a national healing from the terrors of the
conflict, but it did not recognize community grievances. It failed to hold states and groups fully
accountable to their actions, and address or transform the relations between various
demographics that caused the high mortality of the indigenous populations (Corntassel and
Holder 2008).
It is estimated that there are over 200,000 deaths since 1948 caused by the internal conflict of
Myanmar and well over the majority of those deaths have been related to minority ethnic groups.
There are even claims to ethnic cleansing in some regions with forcible removal of certain
groups high resource areas, the promotion of migration of one ethnicity to another region and the
strategic annihilation of various communities by the state when fighting insurgent groups. With
notable international outcry against these injustices, especially after 1988, the state moved into
attempting reconciliation (South 2008). There are three notable phases of reconciliation within
Myanamr, first was the ceasefire agreements in the early 1990s followed by the second phase, of
encouraging national approval of the reformed constitution in the latter 1990s through the early
2000s until the military government transitioned to a civilian government in 2010, which
promoted a third phase of reconciliation through process of drafting a new constitution that did
not come into effect until 2011 (Grundy, et al 2014). However, throughout all of these phases,
ethnic grievances were not identified or addressed.
Critical Aftermath
The reconciliation processes in Peru and Myanmar has been a wonderful example of avoiding
the crux of issues when presented, focusing more on the bigger picture than the nuances and
processes that created that picture. Reconstruction of state institutions that benefits the state and
its citizens is a lengthy process, but one that should have a few more substantial results within
five years rather than fifty years. In effect, by ignoring the list of grievances, the reconciliation
processes have failed and has caused little to no effect on preventing future conflict considering
the insurgent groups in both states continue to attack and incite a state military response.
Therefore, interrupting what could be a stable and positive transition of reconstruction, but there
is still a desire to find feasible and desirable outcomes for current and future conflicts. These two
states offer an analysis between two regions that are rarely compared in development or political
academia. Superficially both regions have long standing conflicts with leftist insurgencies that
had a period of intense escalation in the latter decades of the 20th century and the insurgencies
had incorporated individuals of various demographics, which has affected its multiethnic
societies and incurred more grievances. By looking at the indigenous groups, their grievances
and the state response to these grievances, it is easier to figure the projection of the
reconstruction process, its successes and the issues that incite more failures. Diversity offers an
exchanging of thoughts, ideals and norms, but by ignoring that a state is diverse and complex as
Peru and Myanmar does not only disrupts generalizations. It disrupts the stability and the
humanity of society, especially through the reconciliation and conflict prevention processes,
because their grievances are not brought to attention to the whole of society in the state. With
using the simple foundations of psychology, but not getting attention to issue, the issue cannot be
fixed and prevent further discomfort for either party due to misunderstandings. This leads to the
future implications of how even the best attempts towards negative peace efforts, of ending
conflict, can go awry and prevent any future measures of state sustainability.
A standardized formula cannot be prescribed when there are nuances to culture, languages,
various demographics and ideologies to take into consideration between state and state. What can
be determined, as seen by comparing the conflict within Peru and Myanmar, is how to prevent
certain administrative follies between the state and the marginalized. Looking at grievances is
important to the framework of any peaceful measure. A sustainable and successfully operable
state can only work with more than a majority of the support and will of the people, because this
is how legitimacy is maintained. To maintain that legitimacy there is a need to bring a rapport
between the groups on determining their grievances which will go a long way towards
sustainable development. This article may seem to disagree with reconciliation processes, when
in fact there is more of a disagreement with government administrations that cannot see past the
ideal of national unity to how important individual and community grievances are to the state by
utilizing different techniques of reconciliation processes. By fixing the small cracks, a bigger
crack can’t grow and break the dam. As seen with the brief glimpses into the conflicts of Peru
and Myanmar, there are many variables and a lot of context to consider making an adequate
correlation of analysis to compare. What can be perceived thus far is that the general relations in
both countries are moving forward and away from inciting conflict by forming a cohesive
cooperation that the state and its citizens can accept, but there are still violent events caused by
insurgent groups with a majority of ethnic followers. This is causing more of discrimination
within the state rather than forcing the state and the people to realize the subtext to their woes.
Sometimes when a war is fought for so long, it becomes difficult to distinguish the original
context as well as the contemporary concerns of either side and the state will have little hope to
grow forwards.
REFERENCES
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