Cillian O'Gara

Future of Europe Observer Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 This issue of the Future of Europe Observer examines in what way the EU‘s Global Strategy overlaps with the UN Agenda with special attention to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It comprises of analyses by ZEI Master of European Studies Fellows “Class of 2019”. Selected Contents I. Multilateralism in the Service of Peace and Development ...............2 The concept of resilience...................2 Peacekeeping.......................................3 II. Human Drivers of Change........4 Migration.............................................6 Education.............................................8 Gender equality...................................9 III. Connectivity and Challenges of Region-Building..........................11 Climate policy...................................12 Energy security ................................13 Trade...................................................14 Region-building...............................15 Future of Europe Observer accompanies the debate on governance and regulation in the European Union. Authors are ZEI Scholars, Master of European Studies Fellows and Alumni. Matching the EU‘s international ambitions with UN goals T he EU Global Strategy (EUGS) determines interests, priorities and principles for the EU’s external relations. The EUGS brings out a new vision with the introduction of concepts that will be the base of EU external actions such as ‘principled pragmatism’ - a struggle of the Union to balance principles and pragmatism. Likewise, the EUGS formulates the notion of ‘resilience’ to build pre-emptive policy responses to possible and existing fragile conditions beyond EU borders. Within this concept, special importance has been attributed to the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by arguing that sustainable development lies at the heart of resilient states featuring democracy and trust in institutions. he very status of the EU itself is a development project as it implements regional development policies within the Union. Examples of the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs include instruments adopted for the benefit of the internal market such as energy labelling and eco-design requirements for industrial products. They are supposed to contribute to the use of energy efficiency. Similarly, the EU emissions trading system -a key tool for reducing greenhouse gas emissions - is a cornerstone of the EU‘s policy to combat climate change. Furthermore, the EUGS highlights the importance of the SDGs in the context of EU external action. T T he EU’s enlargement policy can be associated with development. Its ‘Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance’ has supported a wide range policy fields such as environment, energy and transport. Economic and social reforms implemented by candidate countries indirectly contribute to SDGs. As for trade policy, the EU has incorporated sustainable development chapters in free trade agreements with third countries such as Moldova and Georgia. This helps promote human and labour rights and environmental standards and serves the development goals in the countries involved. he European Commission proposed an increase of 30 per cent in the external action budget for the period- compared to the- allocation. The new budget proposal mainstreams sustainable development by placing the topic at the core of most instruments for different geographic target areas. e can deem the EUGS as an indirect commitment to the SDGs as the European Union can use the strategy as an opportunity to operationalise the SDGs. We will need time to observe the impact of the new external budget in the period- to determine the extent to which the EUGS will contribute to the SDGs. T W Imdat Karakoc is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. I. Multilateralism in the Service of Peace and Development SDG16: A just and peaceful society – EU resilience The United Nations SDG Agenda and the EU Emergency Trust Fund hortly after the signing of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development the European Union published its new European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 2016. The document highlights the EU‘s major role on the global stage while emphasising that Europe`s involvement in global affairs is demanded and expected by many international partners. nfluenced by the SDGs, the EU highlighted the significance of resilient states and societies to ensure global stability and sustainability, while reinforcing Europe’s own security and prosperity. The European Commission, in line with the SDGs, set its priorities in areas in which the EU might be able to significantly influence policies at global level. Thus, it has adopted a comprehensive approach to solve and prevent crises, with short-term and long-term oriented components. Likewise, it created a two-pronged strategy to enhance development cooperation in line with the UN’s SDGAgenda, by adjusting its policies and implementing measures under the so-called target development approach. S T wo objectives of the EU are closely connected to the work of the UN. First, advancing Europe`s prosperity must be attained while concurrently working on fulfilling the SDGs worldwide. Second, the Union`s desire to maintain and promote the current rules-based global order will be achieved together with the UN because the EU committed itself to establish a strong UN as the foundation of the multilateral rules-based order. Furthermore, the EU adopted the concepts of resilience and fragility in the EUGS. The differentiation of fragility and resilience has become fundamental in the Union`s situational assessment and therefore guides the EU`s actions in its effort to fulfil the targets set out in SDG 16. Fragility in states close to the EU can be destabilising and threatening for the Union itself. Therefore, stretching east into Central Asia and down south into Central Africa, the EU has a strong interest in investing in the resilience of these states and societies. T he EUGS stresses that this concept is echoing the SDGs by aiming to strengthen democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development in Europe and its neighbourhood. For the EU it is important to identify fragile states and regions because in these conflict-affected areas poverty is increasingly concentrated. The identification of fragile states helps the Union to effectively counter negative developments through its development policy. The EU maintains that fragility must be combated by investing in resilience of affected regions to build the capacity of states and societies to deal with increased risk and maintain or re-establish quickly their core functions after a shock. Since most post-conflict countries are also pre-conflict countries, Goal 16 focuses the work of the EU on conflict prevention. Therefore, post conflict stabilisation becomes conflict prevention. For that reason, the EU`s main contribution to achieving goal 16 has been and is going to be investment in fragile states and regions. Josef Jerke is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. 2 Future of Europe Observer I U nder this approach, the EU founded the EU Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF), which aspires to attack the root causes of the migration crisis. The idea that development aid can discourage people from migrating across territorial borders was the starting point.Underdevelopment such as insufficient access to basic resources and lack of education were defined as the economic root-causes hardening extreme poverty, environmental stress and internal conflicts. H ence, the EU, as an aid donor, founded the EUTF to target terrorism, unwanted migration, and human trafficking, assuming that they are caused by underdevelopment. The aid is allocated to the development sectors that are most relevant for influencing migratory movements. Thus, the EU expects to improve the perspectives in countries of origin, prompting emigrants to stay. This way, the Union wants to contribute to bringing about a higher standard of global welfare and to preventing possible security risks that could threaten the EU. egardless of the evidence showing that aid cannot sustainably deter emigration, member states’ aid agencies have started implementing the programmes, often pointing to plausible security risks emanating from uncontrolled migration. The communities in the selected recipient regions are going to benefit from programmes aspiring to create more opportunities. Among others, the EUTF intends to help small & medium enterprises create sustainable jobs, offer youth entrepreneurial programmes and reinforce measures against human trafficking. This is how the EU’s twopronged approach is supposed to materialise. To mitigate future risks, balancing migration management and tackling root causes will be critical. Luisa Agudelo Blandón is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. R Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 I. Multilateralism in the Service of Peace and Development EU-UN Peacekeeping I n 1948 the United Nations sent its first peacekeepers to the Middle East to preserve a ceasefire Arab states and Israel. Since then, UN peacekeepers have taken part in 72 missions around the world, including 15 missions today. In contrast, the European Union held off on conflict intervention until the 1990s after the collapse of communism in Europe. D uring the Cold War, European states formed closer ties, and after adopting the Rome Treaty in 1957, the European Economic Community (later the EU) gradually took on new member states and fostered deeper integration between them. While Europe lacked a common defence policy, the US-led NATO served to protect Western Europe from the threat posed by the USSR. In addition to acting as a shield against the USSR, NATO also served to allay fears of a nationalist resurgence in Europe. NATO remains the primary military alliance for a majority of the EU member states, in addition to several other non-EU European states. Judging the ongoing reforms that have been carried out as a result of concluding the EU-RM Association Agreement, it seems the EU is suffering from “Moldova fatigue”, according to Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow with the European Council on Foreign Relations. Indeed, at a national level there is a lot of work left to be done, but the EU should not expect Moldova and other Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries to develop and reform as their western neighbours did. Drawing such an analogy would simply be inappropriate due to the distinct history of the EaP states. I n the 1990s, the EU began to play a greater role in conflict intervention, and after the fall of communism in Europe, attempted to resolve the crisis in the Balkans by entering into talks with Yugoslavia to help prevent conflict. However, with some member states favouring the unity of Yugoslavia and others favouring the secession of new states, the EU was unable to form a clear response to the crisis. Only after the outbreak of hostilities did leaders form a unified stance in favour of recognising the seceding republics. T he UN Protection Force was created by the UN Security Council and deployed to Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to observe ceasefires in vulnerable regions. Almost every EU member state contributed troops with the exception of Greece. Future member states were also involved in the mission. By 1995, the EU was better equipped to form a unified foreign policy and was given the capability to act on certain security matters including conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation. W ith more room to act in areas of peacekeeping and conflict intervention, the EU sought the UN’s cooperation in peacekeeping operations. In 2000, EU leaders met in Nice to reaffirm the importance of EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and in 2001, met again in Gothenburg to issue a statement to this effect. Eventually, the EU and UN published a joint declaration in 2003, clearing the way for the EU to take on an important role in peacekeeping operations around the world. Cillian O‘Gara is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 3 I. Multilateralism in the Service of Peace and Development Peacekeeping: Not Just a Humanitarian Issue The UN - EU Peace and Security Policies ver the last 10 years, the resurgence of violent conflict across the globe has brought about a heightened awareness of the need for conflict prevention and management. In 2016 alone, “over 65 million people had been forced to flee their homes due to conflict, violence, repression or disaster – the highest level recorded since World War II,” (Edwards). This level of violent conflict does so much more than destroy the lives of affected individuals; it can fracture societies, harm infrastructure, and set development back exponentially. Preventing conflict is not only a question of humanity and morality, but also exponentially more efficient from an economic standpoint. According to recent studies, “every $1 spent to prevent violence has saved $16 over the past two decades” („No Justification for Atrocity Crimes“). he history of the UN-EU relations started in 1974 when the EU obtained the status of an observer in the UN. In 2011 the EU obtained the status of special observer, with the right to speak but not to vote. Yet, the relationship between the UN and the EU has deepened only with the first Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management in 2003. The joint declaration sets the framework for the future relationship of the two institutions in military as well as civilian operations. In this way, the EU committed itself to contributing to the central mission of the UN: the “maintenance of international peace and security”. The EU has launched the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy in 2016. In the context of the UN-EU partnership, the EU Global strategy confirms the EU’s commitment to the UN’s central mission. oth, the EU and the UN have recognised the importance of conflict prevention and management. Their common ideologies make them a cohesive pair. The UN Charter, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) , and the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) dictate that it is the responsibility of the EU and the UN to promote peace and eradicate conflict to the best of their abilities. Through the establishment of laws, developing competencies that allow for the creation of mechanisms envisioned for detecting potential conflict, and institutions to strengthen the potential for peace in conflict-ridden areas, these organisations have made extensive progress. Analysis shows the efficacy of the multilateral approach taken by both institutions, and their willingness to legislatively, financially, and procedurally integrate across fields and competences has resulted in successes like that of El Salvador. Here combined efforts helped end a civil war and brought about the start of what will eventually become a strong democracy. Moreover, according to the New York Times, “The cost of the four-year UN operation was only $115 million – less than one-tenth of the United States military aid to El Salvador during the war,” (“In El Salvador, UN Had a Success Story”). he background of UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management has its roots in the “Brahimi Report” published in 2000 (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations) which highlighted the failure of the UN to execute its critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks. Faced with rising and complex demands in a number of its missions, the UN is seeking for new partners. In the EU the UN found a reliable partner to achieve its central mission. Best proof of the EU’s commitment is the deployment of 16 civilian and military missions under the EU flag across the globe. Since its first mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a military operation in North Macedonia, the EU has completed 34 operations and missions by today (European External Action Service). While the EU contributes to the UN capacities, there are clear benefits for the EU in this process as well. Rising demands of citizens for more security, awareness of the links between security “in” and “outside” the Union, as well as the partnership with the UN in the peacekeeping missions have fostered the cooperation among member states in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). O B L ooking forward, t is hypothesised that by the year 2030 more than half the world’s impoverished population will be “living in conflict-affected settings” (World Bank). With a forecast like this, it may be difficult to be optimistic about what is to come. However, the EU and UN have fostered a valuable relationship on which they can build to bring about a more peaceful world. Alexandra Janecek is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. 4 Future of Europe Observer T T T his partnership works for both sides: The UN has found a reliable partner for achieving its central mission. For the EU, joining forces with the United Nations implies a more effective response to security risks, which also allows for a deeper integration of the overall CFSP. The choice to build a strong partnership with the UN enabled the EU to protect its own security, but also to develop its overall CFSP by taking an active role in maintaining international peace and security. Nikola Jokic is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 I. Multilateralism in the Service of Peace and Development UN Sanctions against Libya – the EU’s Role I n retrospect, the violent conflict in Libya in 2011 and the massive human rights abuses committed by the Gaddafi regime are of immense importance with respect to the EU’s participation in implementing the UN sanctions. With regard to the military enforcement of a no-fly zone over the country, EU member states were divided: While Germany abstained from the vote on the UN Security Council’s Resolution 1973, France, the UK and Italy as the major actors with the assistance of the United States and the United Arab Emirates launched an intervention. In it, EU member states Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, Romania and Spain played a contributory role. The enforcement of Resolution 1973 as a reaction to the systematic violence being acted upon the civilian population in Libya created a case of precedent for honouring the Responsibility to Protect. Apart from the no-fly zone, the Security Council imposed a ban on all flights designated to the country, a freeze on assets owned by the Libyan authorities. Furthermore, Resolution 1973 extended the travel ban as well as the assets freeze of the UNSC Reslution 1970 to a number of additional members of the Gaddafi regime. These sanctions established to stop the massive human rights violations remain controversial in the practical and academic debate, despite the frequent use as a policy instrument in international diplomacy. ZEI Discussion Paper C 253/2019 “Towards Conceptualizing EU Cybersecurity Law“ By Agnes Kaser & Alexander Antonov In the last two decades, cybersecurity has developed into a horizontal policy issue in the European Union. This Discussion Paper examines the Wannacry cyber crisis in order to establish the types of harms EU cybersecurity-related laws can aim to address. It also elaborates on what elements of the cyber ecosystem need to be secured and can be targeted by regulatory intervention. Kaser and Antonov also look at the main pieces of current and proposed EU legal frameworks relevant for cybersecurity in order to draw conclusions on the scope, nature and aims of the emerging field of ‘EU cybersecurity law’. W hen evaluating the effectiveness of the sanction mechanisms imposed on a country, a distinction between the effectiveness of purely financial and non-financial sanctions has to be outlined (Mack; Khan 2000). With respect to Libya, financial measures had the greater impact when solely regarding the intended outcome. However, long-term effects concerning the civilian population, the economic growth rate of the sanctioned country, the practical implementation level, the investment opportunities and especially the effect on neighbouring regions are all aspects that have to be considered in a critical manner when as-sessing the UN’s measures taken (Ripsman 1999). T he EU Global Strategy, masterminded by the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini in 2016, formulates a “Shared Vision and Common Action for a Stronger Europe” (Global Strategy – EEAS 2016). In it,the strategic goal for “A Peaceful and Prosperous Mediterrane-an, Middle East and Africa” was set out (Global Strategy, p. 34) to develop a common policy response to the growing instability in the region following the humanitarian and political disaster after the overthrow of Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011. The idea to of creating “unity in action” (Global Strategy – EEAS 2016) across different policy fields, especially with respect to neighbouring regions, is key to this ambition. China was elated, but the rest of the international community was surprised by the EU’s position. Surprised, because of the perception of the EU as a power that supports justice and the rule of law. No wonder the state media in Beijing gloated over the statement, claiming it as the “unified” position of Europe. A s a conclusion, it can be stated that the empirical case of the sanctions imposed on Libya shows that the EU has complemented UN actions by cooperating in the policy preparation despite being internally divided on the question of a military intervention. The resulting fragility of the Libyan state shows that the EU must strive for more balanced methods of resolving violent conflicts in the future. For this to happen, the Union has to go beyond the Global Strategy and enhance its multilateral alliances around the world with like-minded actors at bilateral or regional level. Nevertheless, the Strategy provides a good stepping-stone to achieve this. Amira Grotendiek is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 5 II. Human Drivers of Change The interplay between the UNHCR and the EU M igration and Refugees issues are global issues that need global action. There is a necessity for nation states to cooperate, support each other and contribute to the work of international organisations in order to tackle complex problems. The EU is trying to adapt its policies to UNHCR standards and the 1951 Geneva Convention. For example, the head of the EU delegation to the UN in Geneva, who is a member in the UNHCR’s executive committee, stated that the High Commissioner is rightly calling for an improved response to refugee issues, especially in relation to large-scale influxes and mixed migratory movements. In the same vein, a majority of EU member states believes that the response to refugee movements should be guided by principles and the respect for fundamental rights as enshrined in the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention on Refugees. Therefore, the EU has made a commitment to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants that reaffirms these principles as well as the centrality of international cooperation and solidarity to the refugee protection regime (UNHCR, 2017). o sustain cooperation between the supranational and the global level, the UNHCR has established joint operations with the EU in different aspects of the migration issue, while at the same time providing the European Union with recommendations as explained below: T T he European Commission released a number of proposals to reform the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) to prevent irregular onward movements through a combination of punitive measures coupled with strengthened safeguards in some areas. It is a stated goal to enhance solidarity between member states distributing asylum-seekers within the EU based on a corrective allocation mechanism in case of disproportionate arrivals in some states. Apart from that, the UNHCR expressed concern about a key element of the CEAS proposals: the introduction of mandatory admissibility procedures in the absence of independent, reliable and updated information on the situation in countries of origin, which are deemed “safe” for the return of asylum-seekers. Despite this critical assessment, the UNHCR supported the further development of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and of the border agency, Frontex. Simultaneously, the EU institutions increasingly focused on facilitating returns and stemming arrivals along the Central Mediterranean route. Building on the proposed reforms to the CEAS, the UNHCR in December 2016 issued 6 Future of Europe Observer a paper on “Better protecting refugees in the EU and globally: UNHCR’s proposals to rebuild trust through better management, partnership and solidarity’’. In it, the UNHCR considers the establishment of a common registration system, accelerated procedures and distribution mechanisms prioritising family reunion crucial to achieving a more manageable and coherent common asylum system. Furthermore, the UNHCR strengthened its engagement with the judiciary, both at the national level as well as before the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, intervening as a third party in selected cases affecting persons of concern. (Executive Committee of the high Commissioner’s program, 2017). Abdul Basir Shagewal is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Migrants and migration: Are the EU and the UN speaking the same language? D uring the EU “refugee crisis”, rhetoric’s about migration usually opposed those who saw migration as a dangerous invasion and those who saw it as a succession of desperate individual cases fleeing from war or misery. In the first case, semantics were those of “flows” or “masses” of migrants. In the second, migrants were individualised: “individuals”, “a woman”, “a child”. This manner of relating to the migration phenomenon can be seen as a “numerical description”. This article analyses the differences in semantics in the numerical description of migration as expressed by the 2016 EU Global Strategy and the 2018 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular migration. n the EU Global Strategy, migrants are first seen as a wholistic phenomenon. Migration is a phenomenon to “manage”. As the document puts it, “migration management” should be enhanced, “irregular flows” should be stemmed, “regular channels” should be opened, “circular channels” should be implemented. Migrants appear as a flow, a flux that needs management. Migrants are not, at first considered as individuals, people in search of better life, but as an almost “physical” problem: it is a new sort of traffic that has to be regulated just as one would deal with car traffic. n the Global Compact’s Preamble and Guiding principles, the migrants are primarily seen as individuals, therefore Human Rights bearers. This approach is descriptive. These individuals belong to families and communities. Although, immigration is also seen as a global phenomenon, it is first described by its parts: individuals, families, groups, diasporas. From this view, I I Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 II. Human Drivers of Change migrations are not “flows” as in the EU Global Strategy. They are made of people and groups moving from one place to another. The Global Compact describes the migrant phenomenon as the one of an individual migrant that leaves a community in his country, travels individually or with his family, and finds a new group, the diaspora, in the host country. he EU closely participated in drafting the Un Global Compact on migration. Nevertheless, both documents offer a contrasted numerical description of migrations. A flux for the EU. Individual people for the UN. This difference should obviously not be hardened but may explain why so many EU countries did not sign the Global Compact. And why there may be, in the future, further divergences on the interpretation of the text. T Jean-Vladimir Deniau is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. goal is directly correlated to the duty to save lives (European Parliament / European Council / The Council 2017, JOIN(2017) 4 final, p.2), implying that the more border control is implemented, the less casualties occur at sea. Yet, this method forces migrants to choose more dangerous routes, consequently leaving migrants more vulnerable, which ultimately leads to more casualties. In 2018, the total number of arrivals to Italy decreased by 80 per cent compared to 2017. However, recorded deaths of migrants more than doubled - 23.370 arrivals to 1.306 deaths (IOM, DTM Libya 2018). European policy makers should consider this factor. The United Nations have undertaken some steps ahead in this direction. In Art. 23a of the Global Compact on Migration, the signatory parties commit themselves to reviewing “relevant policies and practices” to avoid that they involuntarily increase migrant vulnerability. Comparing the counter-smuggling policies of the UN and the EU M igrant smuggling is considered one of the biggest threats against safe and regular migration as it causes the death of thousands of people every year whilst also undermining the integrity of countries and communities. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime - the guardian of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime - migrant smuggling is the procurement of a person’s illegal entry into a state of which that person is not a national or resident in return for financial or other material benefit (UNODC 2019). The ‘Smuggling of Migrants Protocol’, which supplements the aforementioned UN Convention, requires states to criminalise both smuggling of migrants and enabling of a person to remain in a country illegally. ørgen Carling, one of the researchers appointed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to the Migration Research Leaders‘ Syndicate, divides the implementation of counter-smuggling policies into two main groups: policies that address the supply of smuggling services and those that address its demand. Supply is suppressed by for instance dismantling criminal networks, by deterring new suppliers to enter the market through an increase in penalties or by directly addressing the means used by the industry, such as vessels or social media accounts used to market smuggling services. The European Union seems to mainly focus on border control and on the elimination of criminal smuggling networks. The EU states that this J O n the other hand, addressing the demand of smuggling services aims to change the smugglers’ cost-benefit calculus. One way to eliminate their business model would be to create legal paths for migrants, for instance by sponsoring development, projects and research related to skills partnerships... Migration in many ways is an investment in a safer future based on a lack of choices in the country of origin. Consequently, the root causes of irregular and regular migration should play a major role when implementing policies against migrant smuggling, as they determine the migration pressure people are exposed to. If taken seriously, this would also promote a shift in power relations between the North and the South regarding migration management and security, thus enhancing the importance of international cooperation between receiving and sending or host countries. This necessity does not only concern north-south relations. After all, developing countries host 85 per cent of the world’s displaced persons that usually transit along South-South migration routes (UNHCR Statistical yearbook 2018). Sabrina Ferraz Guarino is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 7 II. Human Drivers of Change Quality education: the SDG 4 and the EU approach T education system of the neighbouring countries such as in the Western Balkans, the Southern Mediterranean, the Eastern Partnership and the Russian Federation. By facilitating studies abroad for students from these emerging regions, the EU promotes the idea of network learning, thereby enhancing the UN’s SDG of quality education. On the other side, the UN does also have positive spillover effects on the EU efforts on quality education. With its 28 member states and 24 official languages as well as the high immigration rates, the EU is a hub of multiculturalism and potential conflicts. In this context, the UN goal on education serves as a cushion to soften tensions and promote political unity within the Union. For instance, the security of the EU is easier to achieve when knowledge is free and universal. EU investments in societal resilience programmes to secure a peaceful recovery from the economic crisis are far more efficient in a society where most people are well educated. Lastly, universal quality education is also important for the EU‘s enlargement plans as it can enable a smoother integration and convergence path. he European Union Global Strategy considers education a very powerful tool to achieve a political economy of peace, to fight terrorism and to increase collaboration within the EU and with neighbouring regions. The European Union is supporting its member states in each educational level, starting from preelementary schooling until research. For instance, the European Education Area is a recent initiative whose main goal is to enable young individuals to access quality education and training as well as to obtain jobs across the continent. Furthermore, the Erasmus Programme has been one of the most successful EU initiatives that has provided support in the form of scholarships, curricula and teachers’ trainings to both member states and partner countries. EU efforts on quality education and on meeting the UN‘s Global Sustainable Development Goals on quality education significantly complement one another. Cooperation within the EU member states makes the policies and intentions of the UN on quality education easier to implement. Moreover, the Erasmus+ Programme supports the Tea Qendrai is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. United Nations Sustainable Development 2016 8 Future of Europe Observer Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 II. Human Drivers of Change Gender Equality in Labour Force Participation F emales worldwide represent great potential for human capital and growth worldwide, this potential often remains untapped. During the past decades, much progress has been made regarding increased female workforce participation in the labour market in the European Union. However, many obstacles remain, including great differences in female labour force participation rates between different member states, which may be a result of several challenges women face in the workplace, such as gender stereotypes, gender segregation in occupation, parenthood, discriminatory work practices and a substantial wage gap. T he UN 2030 Agenda acknowledges gender equality not only as a Sustainable Development Goal in itself but also as a crosscutting critical issue that needs to be addressed throughout the Agenda. The EU Global Strategy touches upon gender equality, especially in regards to improving the EU’s internal gender balance. The EU also works on priorities that are directly linked with the SDG 5 targets, including the European Commission’s 10 Priorities for- and the Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality-. Furthermore, from-, the EU‘s contribution agreements amounted to more than 76.9 million euro for UN Women programmes being implemented worldwide (UN Women, 2016). Most EU member states face severe demographic ageing yet have a great potential for increasing labour supply by bringing more women into the workforce. This is an issue that requires careful coordination among stakeholders to fully address its many challenges. Working in line with the United Nations towards a common global strategy with specific targets will greatly help increase female participation rates within the EU and internationally. It is important for the EU to acknowledge gender equality as a concrete goal and not just as an incorporated component within its different strategies. This should be done in a bottomup approach starting locally and moving on to the EU and the global UN level. When assigning the EU‘s top jobs after the elections to the European Parliament, leaders and MEPs should set an example when it comes to the percentage of women in decision-making positions. The governments of member states need to recognise the opportunity cost their economies are paying by not fully utilising the potential of females. Maram Al-Khatib is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. UN-EU Gender Equality – joint initiatives I n 2017, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) began a joint initiative to battle and wipe out violence against women and girls (VAWG). According to the UN’s website on the programme, the Spotlight Initiative “is so named as it brings focused attention to this issue, moving it into the spotlight and placing it at the centre of efforts to achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment, in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”. The initiative is designed to address “all forms of VAWG, with a particular focus on domestic and family violence, sexual and gender-based violence and harmful practices, femicide, trafficking in human beings and sexual and economic (labour) exploitation”. While the Spotlight Initiative does not directly fight for gender equality, it meets targets and goals of the UN’s and EU’s plans in order to achieve gender equality. One of the targets of the UN Sustainable Development Goal 5 is to “end all forms of discrimination against all women and girls everywhere”, so with the UN participating in this initiative, it is accomplishing one of its targets towards its goal of gender equality. One of the EU’s five priorities of its gender equality strategy is “combating gender-based violence and protecting and supporting victims”, as listed on the European Commission’s website. While participating in this initiative, the EU is also fulfilling one of its five priority areas of its gender equality strategy. The Spotlight Initiative plans to cover the regions of the Caribbean, the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, and Asia and use specific focus areas of VAWG, such as family violence, domestic violence, femicide, trafficking, sexual exploitation, and sexual and gender-based violence. The ultimate aim is to fight the entire spectrum of VAWG in each region, as stated in its Annual Report from 1 July 2017 to 31 March 2018. B y partnering together, the EU and the UN can hold each other accountable in ending violence against women and girls, while also pooling resources together and supporting one another. According to the abovementioned Annual Report by the Spotlight Initiative, the European Union has already committed 500 million euro, thereby demonstrating its importance. To keep up to date with the Spotlight Initiative, the programme can be found on Twitter under the Twitter handle, or account name, @GlobalSpotlight. Natalie Hungate is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 9 II. Human Drivers of Change How UN gender policies translate into EU employment policies T he UN’s sustainable development goal five lays out gender equality and the empowerment of all women as critical goals. Without giving women the means to live independently, the other sustainable development goals cannot be met. Gender equality and women’s empowerment is given a cross-cutting priority in addition to human rights, women, peace and security in all the policies of the EU. The EU has developed several measures to address the issue of gender inequality through a “European Pact for Gender Equality”, strategic engagement for gender equality and the “EU Action Plan-: Tackling the Gender Pay Gap”. O ne of the EU-level headline targets of the Europe 2020 strategy is to rise to 75 per cent of the employment rate for women and men (aged 20-24) by 2020. According to data from the “EU report on the equality between women and men”, the employment of women aged 20-64 has continued to increase slowly but steadily to 66.6 per cent in 2017 compared to 78.1 per cent for men. But despite this progress, women are not achieving full economic independence. The labour market is highly segregated implying that the women are concentrated in a limited number of sectors. The women take career breaks and/or work part-time due to care responsibilities more often than men, which has a negative effect on their length of the service. Various institutional systems and mechanisms, policy regimes and cultural values at member states’ level have significant effects on women’s participation in the labour market. This inequity has to do more with specific groups such as single mothers, migrant women and those with disabilities and there is a need to look at these specific categories and to formulate specific targets to make gender equality work. T he European Commission in 2017 directed its efforts to three main areas namely reducing the gender wage gap, violence against women and women’s participation specifically in the digital sector. To combat the gender wage gap, the Commission presented an Action Plan- with the motive of bringing differences in the pay structure of comparable work within companies to light. The Plan was accompanied by an evaluation report of the Pay Transparency recommendation that was adopted in 2014. 10 Future of Europe Observer T o address women’s under-representation in the labour market, the Commission proposed the Parliament and member states to adopt the worklife balance proposal of April 2017. According to the report “The gender employment gap: Challenges and Solutions”, the cost of a woman’s exclusion from employment throughout her working life is estimated at between 1.2 million and 2 million euro, depending on her educational level. The concept of gender equality is fundamentally present in the values and principles of the EU’s treaties and policies. However, it also needs to be part of the politics of the EU as most policies are scattered across Union’s competences. The supranational level and the member states should step up their efforts to reduce pay gaps, remove hindrances to women’s careers and improve their economic independence and work-life balance and closing the gender employment gap should be an urgent economic and social objective. Tanisha Jugran is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. ZEI Discussion Paper C 252/2019 “Industry 4.0: SMEs Challenges and Opportunities in the Era of Digitalization“ By Chiara Ristuccia The fourth industrial revolution is changing our lives in a pervasive way. Industry 4.0 represents both an opportunity and a challenge for businesses, notably for small and medium-sized enterprises. Cyberthreats are continuing to increase, thus SMEs need efficient cybersecurity solutions to protect their data. The EU countries have promoted targeted initiatives, but they have achieved different levels of digitalisation. This paper analyses the main challenges that businesses are now facing in keeping abreast of the latest technologies and examines the state of play of the digital transformation in Europe. It argues that the European Union can have a leading role in supporting businesses and citizens alike. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 III. Connectivity and Region-Building Financing climate change: UN & EU mechanisms A t UN level, the Global Environment Facility, GEF, which was founded in 1994, and the Green Climate Fund (GCF), launched in 2010, are the two key financial mechanisms for tackling global heating and other environmental problems. The GEF itself operates Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), which was established under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to assist LDCs in carrying out the preparation and implementation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs). L ikewise, the GEF has been entrusted to operate the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) that was set up in the Marrakesh Accords (7th Conference of the Parties - COP7 to the UNFCCC in 2001) for financing projects relating to: adaptation; technology transfer and capacity building; energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry & waste management; and economic diversification. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol of the UNFCC in 2001 has created the Adaption Fund, which since 2010 has committed 564 million US dollar to climate adaptation and resilience activities, including supporting 84 concrete adaptation projects. T he EU is using a slightly different approach as it levers incentives on climate resilient and low carbon investments mainly in two different ways: First, it seeks to grant funding directly to the poorest and most vulnerable countries. By combining grants with loans and equities, it aims to leverage private investment. So far, the EU has allocated 20 per cent of its Multi Annual Financial Framework in its- budget to climate change. By 2020, it will contribute a total of 206 billion euro. In the upcoming budget, 25 per cent will be allocated to tackling climate change, accounting to a total spending of 320 billion euro, according to the Commission’s proposal. T he EU’s traditional funding instrument on climate action, the LIFE + Programme, has already invested 800 million euro to develop and implement innovative ways to respond to climate challenges from 2014 to 2020. It has a budget of 3.4 billion euro in the current period-. In 2018, the European Investment Bank exceeded its climate action target for the ninth year in a row, providing 16.1 billion euro to fight climate change. This number makes up over 29 per cent of all its financing. The EIB main projects include investments in climate change adaption (1.2 billion euro), renewable energy (4.1 billion), research development & innovation (2.7 billion), lower carbon transport (6 billion) and other climate change mitigation measures (1.1 billion) comprising the total investments of EUR 16.1 billion in 2018 only. A s a key initiative, the EU’s Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (GCCA+) connects with UN efforts such as the LDCF and small island developing states to sustain disaster risk reduction efforts or a more resourceefficient land use. The GCCA+ has so far invested close to 450 million euro in more than 60 countries and regional actions. The overall objective is to foster policy dialogue and cooperation on climate change between EU and developing countries. The programme has a strong focus on least developed countries as they are most vulnerable to climate change. Another instrument used by the EU is the European External Investment Plan by which the European Commission allocates 4.1 billion euro and expects a leverage of more than 44 billion euro by 2020. Iris Stafa is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 11 III. Connectivity and Region-Building EU climate policy as foreign policy I n the last decades, environmental change and natural disasters have been one of the significant drivers of migration. Due to the climate change predictions for upcoming times, it is safe to assume that even more people would be forced to migrate as climate change related disasters, such as extreme precipitations and temperatures, become more impactful. Changes to climate conditions would affect livelihoods and cause a further strain on the already controversial topic of climate induced migration. T he European Union Global Strategy is greatly linked to the work of the United Nations in the policy field of climate change. The acknowledgement of the significant importance of climate change has been rapidly growing in the last few decades, which is clearly reflected in the EU’s foreign policy plan, as a vital part of the future of the security of the Union is dependent upon it. A lot of work, including integrating measures into national policies, improving education and investing in scientific research, is being done on its mitigation, by both the EU and by the UN, and these efforts are reasonably interconnected. I n essence, climate change refers to the rise in average surface temperatures on Earth and it affects every aspect of the world we live in. An overwhelming scientific consensus maintains that the basis of these changes lies primarily with the human use of fossil fuels, which releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into the air. These then trap heat within the atmosphere, which can have a range of effects on ecosystems and leads to consequences, such as experiencing more extreme weather events in paradoxical ways – while some parts of the world suffer from damaging floods, others would experience droughts. Scientists believe that Earth‘s temperature will keep going up for the next 100 years. This would cause more transcontinental disruption. Oceans would rise higher. Some places would get hotter weather through the year. Other places might have colder winters with more snow. It is difficult to predict the exact consequences that would occur, but it is generally agreed upon at a scientific and political level, that those would be detrimental to the safety of people around the globe. This would lead to further environmental migration, as people around the globe would need to escape unliveable conditions. Desislava Ekzarova is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. The EU’s Emission Trading System (ETS) cannot stand alone Regulated by the Directive on emissions trading in 2003, the European Commission stated that the European Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) has become the most effective tool for cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In a nutshell, the EU’s ETS covers around 45 per cent of total EU GHG and remains the world largest carbon market today. In its legislative proposal of July 2015, the Commission argues that the EU’s Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) for the Paris Agreement will ensure the effectiveness of its ETS. Overall, the goal set by the Commission is to reduce at least 43 per cent of the GHG emissions by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. However, the EU ETS only encompasses the industrial and power sectors. There are other carbon producing sectors not covered by the EU’s ETS such as building, transport, waste, and agriculture. . The EU together with its member states should find other effective mechanisms for reducing emissions in these sectors. In fact, Eurostat figures suggest that between 1990 and 2016, the Union’s energy use was reduced by almost 2 per cent, whereas member states lowered its GHG emissions by 22 per cent. The EU still has half way to go in order to reach the target of 2030. Looking at the Union’s approach in international development, the EU has already implemented a foreign policy of financing climate change programmes in developing countries. The Commission reported that the EU, its member states and the European Investment Bank together are the biggest contributors of public climate financing to developing countries, giving 20.4 billion euro in 2017 alone. This contribution currently makes the EU one of the largest donors to climate change programmes. Finally, combining internal and external policies on climate change would help the EU fulfill its commitment to the Paris Agreement. In this case, the EU’s ETS should not stand alone – especially against the backdrop that the United Kingdom will likely leave the Union’s emissions trading scheme after Brexit. Dewi Idam Sari is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. 12 Future of Europe Observer Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 III. Connectivity and Region-Building EU energy policy and the UN’s SDG 7 T he challenges of the European Union (EU) regarding energy policy have mostly been discussed with a focus on the economic, legal and political perspective. When it comes to the compliance of the EU energy policy with the UN SDG number seven, the European Union has reached a level of 100 per cent access to energy. However, one of the major‘s discrepancies relates to the question of how affordable the prices of energy services are. According to EUROSTAT (2016), the average electricity price in the EU paid for by households is 20, 4 cents per kilowatt hour, this price differs among the member states. In 2017, households in Denmark and Germany paid 30 cents per kilowatthour, which actually represents the highest price seen in the EU. y 2030, the EU committed itself to ensuring universal, affordable and reliable access by establishing modern energy services. According to the World Bank, the EU’s renewable energy consumption share is 16,5 per cent. The Commission proposed to increase the share by 2030 to at least 27 per cent in renewable energies. In June 2018, the Commission, the Parliament and the Council made a binding agreement to reach renewable energy target of at least 32 per cent (European Commission, 2018). According to data by the European Environment Agency, it might be possible that the EU will reach a 20 per cent level of renewable energy sources by 2020. By 2030, it is expected to double the its share of energy efficiency, which would be a step towards reducing its energy dependency. From a legal perspective, the energy market is a shared competence between the EU and the member states. This makes it difficult to reach a consensus between member states, the Commission and the Parliament, creating tradeoffs between national sovereignty and a supranational single market (De Jong et al, 2015, p. 4). inally, the negative impact of global heating forces the EU to think in longer terms. This is why the Commission emphasises its governance reform of the Energy Union. To achieve that, investment in energy infrastructure, the support for research and innovation sector, investment in renewable energy, taxation, empowerment of local actions, empowerment of sustainable finance, among others, are necessary. Every member state has to adapt its policy and regulation to this long-term action initiated by the EU. Maria Javiera Moya Becerra is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. B F Nuclear Safety: EU – IAEA B y the end of the Second World War, nuclear energy was a horrific military weapon. Nowadays, governments have put it to a peaceful use. According to the World Nuclear Association, the world‘s nuclear reactors in 2017 supplied 2506 billion kilowatt hours of electricity equalling around 10 per cent of global electricity consumption. It is one of the most efficient and lowest-carbon technologies to generate electricity. Therefore, it has become an essential source of energy. With lessons learnt from the Chernobyl and Fukushima plant incidents, it must be deployed with the safest standards. As a worldwide recognised leading expert in the nuclear safety area, the EU makes it a priority to “promote the highest nuclear safety standards in third countries” under the energy security domain of the 2016 EU Global Strategy. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which reports to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, shares a similar vision when it comes to the importance of nuclear science and technology. In what way does the work of both organisations currently complement each other? B y reviewing the four main measures within the EU’s “Strategy for a Community Cooperation Programme in the field of Nuclear Safety-” with the “IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety 2011”, we can observe clear complementarities and synergies. Firstly - after the Fukushima accident - the EU requested its member states to undertake stress test exercises and conduct peer reviews in the so-called “Nuclear Safety Assessment and Review (i)”. n addition, the EU invited its neighbouring countries, such as Armenia and Belarus, to participate and provided them with the necessary assistance for completion. This contributed to a similar action plan by the IAEA. Under the category of “Emergency-planning, preparedness and response (ii)”, the EU’s European Radiological Data Exchange Platform (EURDEP) for radiological data monitoring actually served as a prototype for developing the IAEA’s “International Radiation Monitoring Information System (IRMIS)” for the detection of a potential incident. It supports the implementation of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. As a third measure, the two institutions forged a close cooperation in “Capacity Building (iii)”. This especially encourages national regulatory bodies to pursue training project initiatives in order to avoid duplication of resources. I Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 13 III. Connectivity and Region-Building L astly, the EU has funded a number of IAEA projects to secure the “Protection against ionising radiation (iv)”, thereby strengthening the occupational radiation protection. To conclude, the EU and the IAEA have been long-term partners for more than ten years in the nuclear safety area and they should continue and extend their cooperation for the global benefit of continuously attaining the highest nuclear safety standards. Kwan Yin Chan is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. The Interplay of the UN’s SDGs with the EU’s Trade Policy and the WTO T hrough the “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development”, the UN launched 17 interdependent sustainable development goals (SDGs), and 169 associated targets to balance the three dimensions of development: the social, economic, and environmental. The agenda is an unprecedented one, since it has been the first attempt of world leaders to commit their governments to universally applicable goals reaching across traditional policy areas. The distinct features of the specific goals and targets recognise their integrated and indivisible nature taking into account different national realities, capacities and levels of development whilst respecting Cato Institute 2015 national policies and priorities. Particularly, the SDGs embrace international trade as a catalyser of transformative shifts for realising the 17 goals and 169 targets. Besides, in the aforementioned Agenda, 7 out of 17 SDGs contain targets that either mention trade or have a direct linkage to it. (https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainabledevelopment-goals/) I n its bold Global Strategy, the EU commits itself to the SDGs, stating that they will generate coherence between internal and external dimensions of the Union’s policies and financial instruments (EU Global Strategy 2016, p. 49 f). T he EU’s overall foreign policy approach recognises the importance of interlinking its trade policy for implementing the SDGs: This includes using trade agreements to underpin sustainable development, protection of human rights and rules-based governance. It is likewise, necessary to build stronger links between its trade, development and security policies vis-à-vis African partners. In line with its Global Strategy, the EU already took action to realise the trade-related SDGs. The inclusion of “Trade and Sustainable Development” chapters in trade agreements, the adoption of the “Aid for Trade Initiative” and being a party to the WTO’s “Trade Facilitation Agreement” of 2013 can be seen as supportive actions of the EU. On the other hand, it should be stressed that SDGs are not legally binding, nor supported by a sanction mechanism. Accomplishment of the goals will heavily rely on countries‘ own policies and actions. Although the EU’s current position in the aforementioned supportive actions is quite ambitious, the Union should adopt more effective and structural policies such as finding the right sequence of reforms, implementing complementary policies to amplify growth and reduce poverty impacts of trade. One possible path would be to pilot projects for highlighting the benefits of multilateral trade reforms. Seyma Demirhan is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. 14 Future of Europe Observer Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 III. Connectivity and Region-Building Latin America & the Caribbean: Similarities and Differences in EU and UN strategies Constructing Stronger EU-ASEAN Relations ccording to the EU Global Strategy 2016, the Union wants to intensify its multilateral ties with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in reference to several aspects. Some of these aspects are also reflected in the UN-agenda, expressed in documents and reports published by the UN regional commission for LAC. Comparing both agendas, three similar elements can be found: First, trade is considered as a central element to strengthen cooperation between LAC and global partners, including the EU. It is currently negotiating its biggest trade agreement with MERCOSUR, the South American trade bloc. Secondly, the battle against global heating is to be fought on a global level with combined forces. The Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015 marked the first point of climate cooperation because LAC countries and the EU were leading partners in the forerun of the agreement and successful due to efficient climate diplomacy. Thirdly, the intention to decrease CO2-emissions by promoting renewable energies is stressed in the EU and the UN agendas for LAC. part from the similarities in both agendas, the EU Global Strategy contains elements, which are not reflected in the UN agenda. First, the migration flows in many parts of LAC are not mentioned in the documents of the UN regional commission. This is surprising due to the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, which leads to an intensification of migratory movements. An increasing number of migrants cannot only be observed in Venezuela’s neighbouring countries but also at the border between Mexico and the USA. By contrast, the EU stresses the importance of fighting root causes worldwide but especially in LAC countries. Secondly, the EU wants to step up maritime security and ocean life protection in the overseas region. The UN agenda does not follow this route with reference to the non-prioritisation of this topic by LAC countries. Lastly, peace and security in the region of LAC have been emphasised as an important factor by the EU. However, the UN agenda only mentions peace as a worldwide goal as part of the SDGs but does not focus on the settlements of the current conflicts in the region. s a conclusion, the EU and the UN agendas comprise common political and economic aims in promoting the region of LAC. This strategy could serve to strengthen the UN system. New partners on the global level are needed since the USA retreats from international cooperation. he European Union Global Strategy manifests a common vision towards the role of Europe outside the Union. The agenda defines the global ambition of the EU as an international actor whose main goal is to improve the effectiveness of the defence and security of the Union together with its member states. It is grounded on shared interests and principles that promote and guarantee the safety of citizens, security of their territory. A A A T O ne of the EU’s main agenda is to build a connected Asia, as the region is of strategic and security importance for the EU. The European Union as an emerging actor in the international arena competes with rising Asian states yet at the same time it values dynamic partnerships and existing bilateral relationships. The EU believes that further development and integration between Asia and Europe contributes to the improvement of global governance. The EU has been engaged in ASEAN relations and is more than a distant economic partner as it strives to create shared economic value. Europe follows a forward-looking policy of engagement with Asia. To address a balanced and comprehensive approach towards the region, the strategic framework for enhanced partnership to strengthen EU presence in Asia was adopted in 2001. T he EU, ASEAN and the UN are institutions that have a very similar nature and present a common position on global matters. These organisations seek to develop relationships and build partnerships with countries to produce and promote multilateral solutions to common problems. The ASEAN can learn a lot from the EU in reference to community building efforts and when it comes to developing high-level regional institutions. At the end of the day, these institutions all have similar visions and goals as they seek to build sustainable, prosperous, and peaceful communities. The EU global agenda and the United Nations have a strong commitment to implementing sustainable goals. The EU not only acknowledges but also embraces the global vision behind the UN’s SDG’s. It understands that they can be used as an opportunity to grow, preserve and build a sustainable global environment for a better future. Gabrielle H. Lopez is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Colin von Ciriacy-Wantrup is a ZEI Fellow “Class of 2019”. Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 Future of Europe Observer 15 “Class of 2019“ ZEI Master of European Studies Governance and Regulation Follow ZEI on Social Media IMPRINT ISSN:- Center for European Integration Studies Genscherallee 3 53113 Bonn Germany 16 Future of Europe Observer Editor: Robert Stüwe- Vol. 7 No. 2 June 2019 The Future of Europe Observer is published three times a year. Authors are responsible for the views expressed in their contributions. For references please contact the editors. www.zei-bonn.de